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Abstract
Household incomes in developing countries often rely on a variety of sources. Ana-
lyzing the effects on income inequality of these different sources can help understand
developments underlying overall inequality. South Africa’s levels of inequality have
been characterized as remaining “stubbornly high”(Leibbrandt and Finn, 2012).
Studies show that in the past 20 years, Gini coefficients of per capita income have
increased from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.70 in 2008. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) derived a
method to decompose inequality of income by source followed by a derivation of the
Gini Coefficient by Stark et al. (1986). It therefore becomes possible to assess the
impact of changes in different components on inequality of total household income.
This paper utilizes these techniques to focus on the effect of remittances on inequal-
ity in South Africa. Applying the decomposition of income sources to the South
African National Income and Dynamics Survey (NIDS), the paper will take the
analysis one step further by constructing a counterfactual that allows to compare
current inequality levels to levels that would have prevailed had migration not taken
place. For the construction of this counterfactual, conditional difference in difference
matching will be employed and data on matched non-remittance households will be
used to predict household incomes excluding remittances for migration households.
The findings of this paper show that levels of inequality are still stagnating. While
inequality measured by the Gini coefficient is lacking significant improvement, the
counterfactual analysis shows that without remittances, inequality would be slightly
worse than current levels. The counterfactual estimation thus supports the result of
the decomposition of the Gini coefficient that also finds a minor inequality reducing
effect of remittances.
1 Introduction
When a household sends out one or more migrants, it is often observed that these migrants
send back personal transfers in cash or kind to their regions of origin. These transfers are
referred to as remittances. Remittances have long been a topic of academic studies and
it is often discussed whether such payments may have an increasing or decreasing effect
on levels of inequality. The impact of remittances is unclear a priori to migration due to
the unknown placement of migrants in the initial income distribution. On the one hand,
remittances have the potential to be equalizing. In this case, remittances would mostly
be flowing towards households at the bottom end of the income distribution, thereby lift-
ing these households and making overall income distribution more equal. On the other
hand, remittances could increase inequality. There are two cases where this may happen.
Firstly, an increase in inequality will occur if migration costs are relatively high. This can
prevent poorer households from sending migrants as they face larger constraints. In such
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a case, remittances flow towards the already better off and levels of inequality worsen.
Secondly, it is possible that poorer households face higher opportunity costs of migration
and hence abstain from sending out migrants. Opportunity costs can be too high if the
labour of a migrant is needed in the immediate household more than financial assistance
in the form of remittances are needed for the household income. In this instance, re-
mittances would again increase inequality levels as they would favour households located
at the upper end of the income distribution. Additionally, Stark, Taylor, and Yitzhaki
(1986) argue that the effects of remittances on income inequality depend on the size of
remittance payments relative to income from other sources. This highlights the complex
and versatile effects of remittances.
However, remittances can have numerous other effects on sending households. Docquier
and Rapoport (2006) summarize some effects found in the remittance literature, which
include positive contributions of remittances on liquidity constraints for example on the
educational investment of households (Perotti, 1993) or for entrepreneurship (Mesnard,
2004). Furthermore, remittance payments can be used for consumption smoothing in the
receiving household as well as for insurance. Rural households are highly vulnerable to
fluctuating incomes as they are more dependent on external factors in order to receive
income from agricultural activities. Rural households may experience lower agricultural
income due to a drought or other unpredictable factors. A member of the household
that migrated to urban areas can assist with consumption smoothing as risks associated
to urban incomes are generally uncorrelated with those experienced by rural households
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2006). Lastly, Docquier and Rapoport (2006) emphasize the
positive effects on growth that are associated with the distributive effects of remittances.
In the South African context the source decomposition of income inequality with re-
gards to remittances is especially interesting. In 1994, the system of apartheid officially
ended for South Africa with the democratic election of a new government. The onset of a
new democracy ended a regime of racial discrimination that had severely obstructed the
freedom of the majority of the South African people especially in the later decades of the
20th century. During the apartheid era, migration laws restrained the free movement of
labourers and prohibited permanent migration for a majority of the population (Posel,
2010). With the new democracy came new opportunities and for the period of 1993 to
2002, households increasingly contained one or more migrants that were absent from the
household to work or in search for work and most of these households also reported the
recipience of remittances (Posel, 2010). However, levels of inequality in overall per capita
income have increased in the post-apartheid era. According to Leibbrandt et al. (2010),
the Gini coefficient was at around 0.66 in 1993 from which there has been an increase in
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inequality to a Gini of 0.70 in 2008. A decomposition of these inequality levels will allow
to disentangle the a priori uncertain effects of remittances as well as the effects of other
income sources on inequality.
For this paper it is especially interesting which factors appear to be the driving force
behind the high levels of inequality witnessed in South Africa and how remittances may
affect present inequality. In order to offer a more thorough analysis, a counterfactual
scenario will be constructed that will predict household incomes without migration. Op-
posed to previous studies, the counterfactual created in this paper uses propensity score
matching in order to avoid selection bias in the estimation of remittance-excluding house-
hold income. Propensity score matching can be employed given that a certain set of
assumptions holds; it will be shown later in this paper that the assumptions for propen-
sity score matching are satisfied by the data. Therefore, propensity score matching is the
best solution for the construction of a counterfactual in this paper. For the counterfactual
scenario, it is not possible to simply set income from remittances equal to zero and thus
exclude them from the analysis. This approach would ignore how households may com-
pensate missing remittance income with income from other sources. Furthermore, one
cannot simply take all non-remittance receiving households to predict the counterfactual
income for households that receive remittances as it can be assumed that the two types
households differ systemically. Therefore, difference in difference matching is employed
to find those households that do not receive remittances but are similar to households
that do. The data on these matched households of the non-remittance control group will
then be used to predict household income for the households in the remittance group in a
non-migration counterfactual. The final step of the counterfactual analysis will then see
to calculate the Gini coefficients of the predicted income distribution in order to measure
the level of inequality that would have prevailed without migration and without remit-
tances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the literature review, Section
2.1 will introduce the topic of migration in academic literature and will give a general
understanding of incentives for and effects of migration. Section 2.2 will then review
existing literature on remittances and income inequality. Literature on the method and
application of the decomposition the Gini coefficient according to income components
will be discussed and the Gini coefficient as a measurement of inequality will be reviewed.
In Section 3 the methodology of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient as well as the
methodology for the creation of a counterfactual will be discussed. Furthermore, different
possibilities of creating a counterfactual will be discussed in order to establish why propen-
sity score matching is suitable in this context. Section 3.4 therefore reflects on methods of
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propensity score matching. These methods will then be applied to the data of the South
African National Income and Dynamics Survey (NIDS). Therefore, Section 4 will present
the NIDS data set in detail. The results of the analysis will then be discussed in Section
5. Section 5.1 thereby presents the results of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient
for all waves of the NIDS data separately. In Section 5.2 propensity score matching will
be applied in order to estimate the counterfactual levels of inequality. Finally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature on remittances is multi-faceted and broad. In order to comprehend those
papers focusing on remittances, a general understanding of the theories of migration is
instrumental. For this reason, this section offers a short introduction to migration in
the literature before moving on to discuss the literature on remittances and inequality
specifically. In the migration literature, many theories are developed with regards to
international migration, however most of the concepts discussed here are applicable to
internal migration and literature on both concepts will be reviewed.
2.1 Background on Migration
Since Roy (1951) the ground rules for the economics of migration were formulated. Roy’s
model utilizes an income maximization framework and forms the conceptional ground for
a major body of literature on migration. The author conceptualizes the idea that migrants
move in prospect of higher incomes to be generated at the migration destination. Together
with incomes in the source economy and incomes expected at the receiving destination,
the cost of this migration forms the third determinant of who migrates and who stays
at home. However, further selection effects are found when studying the characteristics
of migrants. Roy (1951) defines three possible selection effects that may occur. Firstly,
there may be positive selection. This means that migrants earn above average wages in
the location of origin as well as at the area of destination, this destination can be abroad
or a national higher income destination. In this case, migrants are more likely to emanate
from households at the upper end of the income distribution in their source areas and
may well outperform colleagues at the receiving destination. However, the latter only
holds true assuming no discrimination of migrants due to racial or cultural backgrounds.
Whenever positive selection occurs, the possibility for a brain drain to exist increases
as well (Borjas, 1991). Literature on the brain drain, which is defined by Beine et al.
(2008) as “the international transfer of resources in the form of human capital [which]
mainly applies to the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from developing
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to developed countries”, forms another branch of migration literature but will not be
considered further in this paper.
The second effect Roy (1951) defines is that there may be negative selection. This occurs
when migrants are under-performing in their home as well as at their destination’s labour
market. The phenomena of negative selection is observed if the home income distribu-
tion is more unequal than at the destination point. This implies that low-income workers
would experience better insurance against such low incomes at the destination than at the
origin. Therefore, low ability workers can still improve their situation through migration
although they would remain at the bottom end of the income distribution. This case is
less applicable to internal migration as any form of insurance against low income would
be the same across areas within a country. Therefore internal migration would not occur
in this instance.
Lastly, there could be refugee sorting. This is the case in which migrants are under-
performing at home but outperforming natives in the destination country. This is the
case for example when migrants were suppressed at their source location. Although less
likely, refugee sorting can occur with internal migration if a certain population group is
discriminated against in certain parts of a country but not in others.
Further analysis of these selection effects is given for example in Borjas (1991). Bor-
jas (1991) concludes that migrants are a non-random sample of the population. Selection
is based on observable characteristics, such as education, and on non-observable variables
such as productivity and ability. On top of this first step of selection, migrants also select
themselves into different host regions or countries. During the course of his investigation,
Borjas (1991) found that laxer restrictions to migration to the United States led to a less
competitive migrant labour force as a higher number of less-skilled individuals were at-
tracted compared to labour markets for example in Australia or Canada, where migrants
are sorted more stringently according to skills.
Additional analysis by Grogger and Hanson (2011) finds that aside from positive se-
lection, positive sorting is also a common feature in international migration. Positive
sorting indicates that migrants with higher levels of education are more likely to sort
themselves to migrate to countries that are characterized by higher rewards to skills,
according to Grogger and Hanson (2011). Their findings indicate that in terms of selec-
tion effects, given any pair of source-destination countries migrants are relatively more
educated compared to non-migrants when absolute wage difference due to skill-related
variations between the country of origin and the migration destination are larger. Addi-
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tionally, the study on sorting effects indicates that the stock of more educated migrants
at the migration destination is increasing as the absolute difference in wages between low-
and highly skilled workers increases. Grogger and Hanson (2011) discovered these findings
in a study on international migration, however, it is plausible that similar holds true for
wage differences within a country.
Given these studies on migration in general, the next section will focus on the effects
of migrants’ transfers to their family members remaining in the home location.
2.2 Remittances and Inequality
Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) examine the impact of rural-out migration upon house-
hold income distribution in Mexico. The authors find that the effects of remittances on
income distribution vary depending on the migration history of the respective villages. In
a village with a long migration history, members of a village that migrated at an earlier
stage contribute to an increased opportunity for members of poorer households to mi-
grate later on. Stark et al. (1986) identify what later became known as network effects.
Such effects ease the access to migration for poorer households. In this case, remittances
can have a decreasing effect on inequality. However, in villages with a short or recent
migration history, remittances will necessarily be distributed rather unequally. For a vil-
lage at this stage, migration is described as subject to a higher degree of uncertainty as
information is scarce, hence, Stark et al. (1986) identify households from the upper end
of the income distribution to be more likely to migrate. However, the effect of remit-
tances is also dependent on their relative magnitude in comparison to income from other
sources. In this matter, the paper by Stark et al. (1986) holds valuable information due
to the fact that their results are found whilst studying two Mexican villages with different
characteristics regarding remittances and migration history. Therefore their analysis al-
lows to better compare the effects of internal and international migration with each other.
In their analysis, Stark et al. (1986) implement a new statistical concept to identify
the role of remittances as well as other income components in the distribution of village
incomes. To complete such an undertaking, they use the decomposed Gini coefficient
introduced by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) which identifies the role of different sources
of income in overall income inequality. Using such a Gini index to measure the effect of
remittances on the income distribution, the role of remittances can be decomposed into
three parts. Firstly, the share of remittances in overall household income; secondly, the
inequality in remittance payments and lastly, the (Gini) correlation between remittances
and total household income. The specifics of this method will be applied and discussed
later in this paper (see Section 3.1). In their article, Stark et al. (1986) find that especially
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in more costly international migration, a village with a shorter migration history shows
significantly larger inequality in remittances. Furthermore, migrants are predominantly
sent from households at the upper end of the income distribution. However, compared to
international remittances, internal migrants’ remittances report a lower degree of inequal-
ity. In a village with a longer migration history, remittances from international migrants
are more equal than payments from internal migrants. Therefore, this effect is opposed
to the situation of a village with a short migration history. As described above, it is
plausible that due to the long migration history, households at the bottom end of the in-
come distribution are able to send out migrants as well. For both villages, the correlation
between remittances and total household income is rather small.
This paper follows the approach of Stark et al. (1986) and thus uses the Gini coeffi-
cient as a measurement of inequality. There are a number of different measurements for
inequality such as the Theil index, the Atkinson index or other indeces; each one has its
own advantages and disadvantages. So does the Gini coefficient, although it is by far the
most commonly used measurement of inequality according to DeMaio (2007). The Gini
coefficient measures the space between the Lorenz curve and the 45◦ line of equality in
a graphic that depicts the cumulative percentage of population and income. The Gini
coefficient fails to reflect different shapes of potentially intersecting Lorenz curves that
both have the same Gini coefficient but not the same income distribution (Cowell, 2000).
Furthermore, the Gini coefficient is strongly sensitive to inequality at the centre of the
income distribution. For this paper this is a serious constraint as this may not be where
most remittance receiving households are located. Because of its sensitivity to inequality
in the middle of the income distribution, the Gini coefficient is not value free. However,
the main reason for its popularity is that the Gini coefficient reflects the income distribu-
tion as one single summary statistic.
In a more recent study on international migration, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) an-
alyze the effects that Stark et al. (1986) found. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) aim to
explain the network effects of migrants as well as the diverse consequences of inequality
and migration. The authors provide convincing theory that mainly middle-income fami-
lies are sending out migrants. Families with higher incomes lack the incentives to migrate
and low-income families lack the means to do so. Furthermore, they conclude that remit-
tances have a decreasing effect on inequality only in those villages with a long history of
migration. In such villages, poorer households are also able to send out migrants as they
face lower migration costs due to existing networks in the receiving region or country.
Overall, there seems to be Kuznet-shaped relationship1 among communities with a wider
range of migration experiences.
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Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent (2010) apply exactly those methods introduced
by Stark et al. (1986) to South African data. They utilize three consistent sets of na-
tional survey data in order to assess developments of inequality over time. The data sets
utilized are the survey undertaken in the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards
Development (PSLSD), the Income and Expenditure Survey of 2000 and the first wave
of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) in 2008. According to their findings re-
mittances have a rather small however possibly negative role on inequality, implying that
remittances may serve to lower inequality. They also find strong fluctuations in the share
of households receiving remittances. This share was equal to 24% in 1993, rose to 36% in
2000 only to fall back to 14% in 2008. Most importantly, the study finds an increase in
overall inequality over the time period under observation.
Although they introduced a novel method of analyzing income inequality according to
components, the paper by Stark et al. (1986) has a very strong short-coming, namely, the
lack of a counterfactual analysis to determine developments of the village income distri-
butions without remittances. Adams (1989) introduces a non-remittance counterfactual
analysis in a paper on remittances of workers and their effects on inequality in rural Egypt.
Adams (1989) characterizes the inability to predict migration and income functions in
order to be able to compare pre- and post-migration income data as one of the reasons
why the literature has struggled to determine whether remittances increase inequality or
not. He therefore develops a counterfactual scenario using household survey data from a
rural area in Egypt. Adams (1989) uses three equations for his analysis that determine (1)
who is migrating, (2) how remittances affect pre-migration income and (3) remittances’
effect on post-migration income. The estimation equations of pre- and post-migration
income thereby only differ by a migration dummy being added to the income function
excluding remittances. Adams uses data available from the households that are not receiv-
ing remittances to estimate a set of parameters predicting income excluding remittances
and then applies these parameters to all households in order to generate a non-migration
counterfactual. He also predicts household incomes for the migration counterfactual by
applying a similar method to households receiving remittances, predicting parameters
and then estimating gross household income including remittances for all households (see
Adams, 1991). However this estimation procedure is vulnerable to a possible bias between
migrant and non-migrant families. Selection bias has long been discussed and established
in migration literature, hence the veracity of income predictions not taking this bias into
account will be questionable. In Section 3.2.1, a method to account for this bias will be
discussed in more detail.
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Acosta et al. (2008) use a very similar approach to the one of Barham and Boucher
(1998) described in Section 3.2.1. The authors firstly follow the methodology introduced
by Stark et al. (1986) to uncover the link existing between remittances and inequality.
For this purpose, they use data from household surveys of ten Latin American countries
and decompose the Gini coefficient according to income components for all ten countries.
As mentioned before, the authors again note that this approach implies remittances being
exogenous transfers by migrants. They point out that the implicit counterfactual scenario
would mean that there are changes in remittances but no changes in migration. How-
ever, following their estimation of household income without remittances Acosta et al.
(2008) highlight that one has to control for the possibility of a selection bias. Similar to
Barham and Boucher (1998), they add a “propensity to migrate”in the Heckman (1979)
two-step estimation framework and simulate an error component in order to account for
the possible bias. They do not however include a separate estimation for labour force
participation as previously explained by Barham and Boucher (1998). Their results show
that unlike in the studies of Adams (1989) or Barham and Boucher (1998), the selection
coefficient is significant and positive. Overall, remittances show an inequality reducing
effect in the Latin American countries under observation. However, the reducing effects
of remittances on inequality appear small, even after applying the procedure of imputing
home earnings for migrants. Additionally to the effects of remittances on inequality, the
authors also test for the effects of these transfers on poverty. Again, remittances have a
decreasing effect on poverty levels, however the effect is rather small. Furthermore, the
results differ considerably across countries which makes a common conclusion difficult.
All in all, Acosta et al. (2008) offer a substantial analysis of the effects of remittances on
different aspects relevant for developing countries. Section 3 will discuss the assumptions
relevant for propensity score matching in more detail as well as the overall methodology
used in this paper. This includes the decomposition of the Gini coefficient as well as
detailed discussion of propensity score matching and matching algorithms. Furthermore,
Section 4 will discuss data concerns relevant for the Gini decompositions as well as the
construction of a non-remittance counterfactual using propensity score matching.
3 Methodology
Different concepts of analyzing the role of remittances have been discussed in Section
2.2. This section focuses on the methodology implemented in this paper. Firstly, the
decomposition of the Gini coefficient will be discussed following the Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1985) approach that was further developed by Stark et al. (1986). Furthermore, Adams’
approach (1989) of a counterfactual will be explained and further advanced by imple-
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menting propensity score matching in the choice of non-remittance households that will
be used in the estimation of the counterfactual.
3.1 Decomposition of Income Inequality
In this subsection, the analytical framework introduced by Stark et al. (1986) and Ler-
man and Yitzhaki (1985) will be presented. The index presented here is a Gini coefficient
decomposed into the different sources of income. The decomposition of the Gini coeffi-
cient is instrumental to analyze the role of remittances in more depth but also to gain a
deeper understanding of the underlying factors of South Africa’s persistently high level
of inequality. It points out the dominant sources of income in the overall income distri-
bution in South Africa. By decomposing the Gini coefficient it is possible to focus on
the following crucial concepts. Firstly, the share of remittances in total household income
can be analyzed. Furthermore, decomposing the Gini makes it possible to determine the
distribution of remittances (and other income sources), and finally, the correlation of re-
mittances with overall household income can be examined. This correlation reflects how
a change in remittances may affect total household income and the distribution of overall
income.
3.1.1 The Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient
In this paper, the Gini coefficient of per capita household income in South Africa will
be decomposed into K components of household income. Let y1, y2, . . . , yK denote the
different income components. For the remainder of this analysis, the components yk are
assumed to be remittances but also include wage income and income from non-employment
sources such as government grants, agricultural income and income of a capital nature.
Overall household income, i.e. the sum of the different components yk, is then given by y0
and can be formalized by y0 =
∑K
k=1 yk. As in Stark et al. (1986), the level of inequality
for total household income, the Gini coefficient of y0, is then assumed to be given by
G0 =
2Cov [y0, F (y0)]
µ0
. (1)
In this formulation, G0 represents the Gini coefficient of total household incomes. In
equation (1), µ0 denotes the mean of household incomes and F (y0) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of total household income y0. Following Stark et al. (1986), equation








given that y0 =
∑K
k=1 yk and utilizing the properties of covariance. In equation (2),
Cov [yk, F (y0)] is the covariance between income source k and the cumulative distribution
of income, F (y0). This redefinition of the Gini coefficient for overall household income
(G0) allows for the final step of the decomposition. Assume that Sk is the share of income




Furthermore, Gk is the corresponding Gini coefficient that measures the level of inequality
in income component k. As such, Gk can be formalized by rewriting equation (1) for yk.
As previously discussed, the decomposition of the Gini coefficient allows to analyze three
important concepts. Such concepts include the share Sk of income from source k in total
household income as well as k’s distribution. The final concept mentioned previously is
the correlation of remittances or other incomes yk with overall household income. This
correlation is given by
Rk =
Cov [yk, F (y0)]
Cov [yk, F (yk)]
.
In this equation, Rk represents the Gini correlation of income from component k with
overall income y0.
Given the definition of Sk, Rk as well as the Gini Gk of income component k stated
above, equation (2) can be rewritten by the following steps. When dividing equation (2)
by overall income y0, one obtains the relative Gini. This is then multiplied and divided
by both the covariance of k with the cumulative distribution of k, i.e. Cov(yk, Fk) as well




k=1Cov [yk, F (y0)]












Cov [yk, F (y0)]
Cov [yk, F (yk)]







Rk ·Gk · Sk.
(3)
Hence, equation (3) yields the source decomposition of the Gini coefficient. Stark et al.
(1986) assume that for any given income source k in equation (3), the larger the product of
the three components, Sk, Gk and Rk, the larger is the contribution of k to the overall level
of income inequality G0. By definition, the components Sk and Gk are always positive
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but smaller than 1. The properties of Rk, however, are a mixture of the properties of
the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficient. Stark et al. (1986) summarize the
properties of the correlation between income source k and total household income y0 as
follows:
1. −1 ≤ Rk ≤ 1. Rk is equal to zero if yk and y0 are uncorrelated. Rk is equal to 1
if yk is an increasing function of total household income and -1 if it is a decreasing
function.
2. If yk and y0 are normally distributed, then Rk will be equal to the Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient ρ.
These characteristics allow the decomposed Gini to determine the three previously de-
scribed terms of the role of remittances. Firstly, the share of remittances in overall
household income; secondly, the inequality in remittance payments and lastly, the (Gini)
correlation between remittances and total household income.
3.1.2 The Derivation of the Decomposed Gini Coefficient
The previous subsection has successfully shown that the decomposition of the Gini coef-
ficient presents a derivation that allows for an analysis of how remittances influence the
overall income inequality in different ways. This includes the share of remittances as one
income source in the total household income, the inequality in the distribution of remit-
tances as well as the correlation of remittances and overall household income. However,
the decomposed Gini as presented in equation (3) offers the opportunity for even more
detailed analysis. As such, the formula of the decomposed Gini can be used to examine
the effects of a marginal change in one income component of the total distribution of
income. This section will carefully explain how the effect of a 1-percentage change in any
income component on the overall Gini coefficient G0 is calculated.
Assume that results of household labour and production decisions are held constant.
If then an exogenous change in any income component j by a factor e occurs, income
from j is assumed to change according to yj(e) = (1 + e)yj. The first derivative of the
decomposed Gini is then stated by Stark et al. (1986) as
∂G0
∂e
= Sj(Rj ·Gj −G0) (4)
where equation (3) is derived with respect to the small percentage change e in income
from a particular source j. In equation (4), Sj is the respective jth income share, Gj is
the Gini coefficient of income source j and G0 the overall Gini coefficient. Additionally,
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Rj represents the correlation between income from source j with total income before the







Equation (5) reflects how a small exogenous change in one income component j affects
the overall Gini coefficient G0. As can be seen from equation (5), the relative effect of a
marginal change e in income component j on overall inequality equals the relative con-
tribution of that component j to total inequality, i.e. Sj ·Rj ·Gj/G0, less the share Sj of
income from component j.
Given equation (5), the effects of income through remittances can be divided into two
categories. Assume income component j represents income from remittances. On the one
hand, if Rj states a negative or zero correlation between remittances and total household
income, any increase in remittances will necessarily lower inequality due to the fact that
any share Sj of income from remittances as well as the Gini indices for remittances and
total income, Gj and G0, are always positive. On the other hand, if Rj is positive, the
effect of remittances on inequality depends on the sign of Rj ·Gj−G0 in equation (4). As
pointed out above, the Gini correlation coefficient Rj is always smaller or equal to 1 (or
-1 if not assumed to be positive). Hence, inequality in remittances must be higher than
inequality of total income for overall inequality to increase, i.e. Gj > G0 forms a necessary
condition given a positive Gini correlation between remittances and total income.
This section has tried to stress how the decomposition of the Gini coefficient and its
derivation can offer critical information on the effects of different income sources on overall
income inequality. Therefore, section 5.1 will apply this decomposition to South African
data. The effects of remittances on income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient will
be analyzed. Furthermore, the effect of a marginal change in remittances on total inequal-
ity will be discussed. However, it is possible to take the analysis of the Gini coefficient
in South Africa even further. For this purpose, this paper creates a counterfactual where
income from remittances ceases. The next section will explain how this counterfactual is
created in more detail.
3.2 Non-Migration Counterfactual
Borrowing from Adams (1989), the effects of remittances on household incomes and in-
come distribution will be analyzed. The methodology used by Adams (1989) and its
shortcomings have been raised in the literature review in Section 2.2. This subsection de-
scribes the methodology developed in this paper to reduce bias associated with selection
13
when creating a non-remittance counterfactual. The main goal is to predict household
income in case there would be no remittances. For this purpose, Adams (1989) used the
non-migration households to estimate predicted household income excluding remittances,
denoted as PREX. Subsequently, Adams (1989) applied the regression parameters ob-
tained to all households, thus predicting overall household income without remittances.
However, this approach ignores the systematic differences between migration and non-
migration households, often referred to as selection bias. Therefore, this section carefully
develops a method that will account for the systematic differences between migration
households and non-migration households. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that
the method described in this section and applied in later parts of this paper is not the
only possible way to correct for time invariant unobservables in estimations regarding a
non-migration counterfactual.
3.2.1 Different Approaches to non-migration Counterfactuals
Barham and Boucher (1998) analyse the overall effect of migration and remittances on
the distribution of incomes in a town in Nicaragua. Barham and Boucher (1998) stress
the differences in the role of remittances depending on how these payments are viewed.
Income from remittances can be treated as exogenous transfers or they can be treated
as a substitute for earnings in the receiving household. The authors determine the latter
definition as more interesting since the economic question analyzed becomes one that will
have to create a counterfactual that imputes for home earnings of migrants had they not
migrated. In order to achieve this, the earnings equation is estimated using a double-
selection Heckman model (Heckman, 1979). The first selection rule is thereby given by
the choice of migration and the second by the choice of participation in the labour force
of non-migrants.
In their paper, Barham and Boucher (1998) decompose the Gini according to remit-
tance and non-remittance sources briefly, treating remittances as an exogenous transfer.
Applying the method introduced by Stark et al. (1986) they find that remittances appear
to have a lowering impact on inequality in the income distribution observed. More impor-
tantly, they develop an econometric model to estimate home earnings of migrants using a
double selection model on labour market participation and migration. The authors find
that participation rates in the village observed are very low and conclude that migrants
may not be randomly drawn from the population. Instead migrants may have self se-
lected due to higher levels of motivation present in individuals who are willing to migrate
but not in those that stay in the village under observation. This calls for measures to
correct for the bias induced by systematically different subgroups when estimating mi-
grants’ home earnings. Covariates used broadly fit into two categories, human capital
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characteristics, such as level of education and age, as well as variables to characterize the
family structure. This stems from the conception that better educated individuals are
more likely to migrate and that the head of household for example is less likely to migrate.
In the first step of their estimation, Barham and Boucher (1998) find that the propensity
to migrate as well as the probability to participate in the labour force increase with age at
first and then decrease. Furthermore, a lower level of education seems to lead to a lower
likelihood of that individual to participate in the labour force and a lower propensity
to migrate. Finally, men originating from middle income households seem to be most
probable to migrate. The results of this bivariate probit estimation using maximum like-
lihood on the labour force participation and the migration decision are then employed in
the estimation of the earnings equations. For this estimation, they include two selection
coefficients to correct for a possible bias due to non-random selection and compare it to
the estimation without the correction. The selection coefficients are constructed for each
individual using the parameter estimates of the bivariate probit estimation and are then
included in the OLS estimation of the (selection corrected) earnings equation. The results
of this regression show that for the village under observation the selection coefficients ap-
pear small and statistically insignificant. This leads to the conclusion that in this case, the
subgroup of non-migrant participants of the labour force is selected randomly from the
overall population. This is opposed to their former assumption of non-random selection
of migrants.
In their further analysis, the authors use their previous estimations to impute individ-
ual earnings in order to construct the Gini coefficient of the non-migration counterfac-
tual. Following through with their analysis, the authors construct different non-migration
counterfactual Gini coefficients. They find that when following the Lerman and Yitzhaki
(1985) approach and treating remittances as an exogenous transfer, these transfers have
a decreasing effect on inequality. However, in their counterfactual estimation, treating
remittances as substitutes for home earnings, inequality actually rises by the cause of
remittances. In summation, potential earnings of migrants had they stayed home would
have a more positive effect regarding equality in income distributions than remittances do.
However, it will be shown later in this paper that the double-selection Heckman model
is inapplicable in the case under observation as the restrictions of the model cannot be
met by the data. Acosta et al. (2008) also implement a selection-corrected Heckman
(1979) estimation framework that includes a ‘propensity to migrate’ but does not per-




In his paper, Adams (1989) sets out to determine what the income of migration households
would look like if migrants had not migrated and would still be part of the receiving
households. As this information is unobservable at the time when data on remittances is
collected, necessity arises to predict what the non-remittance income of households would
look like. For this purpose, Adams (1989) estimated overall household income without
remittances from those households that had never received remittances. Through this
method, he obtained parameters to predict income excluding remittances (PREX) for all
households. In this paper, Adams estimation is slightly modified to suit the South African
context. Therefore, the equation for predicted household income excluding remittances
can be formalized as:
PREX = HH ASSET + EDUC +HHSIZE +GEOTY PE +HHRACE (6)
Equation (6) represents the identity of the estimation equation. It was estimated using
ordinary least squared (OLS) method. Covariates used include HH ASSET which is the
index of all assets owned by the household and EDUC which represents the mean level of
education of the household. The variable HH ASSET is assumed to have a positive effect
on household income. It captures household assets such as property in form of a house or
dwelling as well as movable assets such as vehicles for private or commercial use and the
ownership of any form of livestock including cattle, sheep, chicken etc. The mean level of
education in the household is captured in years of schooling whereby post-school education
such as academic degrees and certificates are counted as additional years of schooling. It
can be assumed that higher educational levels would yield higher incomes, hence EDUC
is assumed to have a positive effect in the estimation of PREX. HHSIZE is the num-
ber of residents in the household and GEOTY PE determines whether the household is
located in a rural or urban area. Household size can potentially have a positive effect on
household income, however, the positive effect may be dampened by the fact that income
has to be spread across more people. Households located in different geographical re-
gions face different labour markets and as such different opportunities for employment as
well as training; different skills are needed in rural areas compared to urban regions and
schooling opportunities differ across regions. It is therefore necessary to include a variable
GEOTY PE that captures the effects of rural versus urban areas. Finally, HHRACE is
included to capture possible effects of race on the household income. It is a wild card for
a set of racial dummies that will be included in the estimation for PREX in order to cap-
ture possible effects of different races on the household income. Categorical variables for
each race are included because the association with different ethnic groups has a histori-
cally important role in the South African context. Given the suppression of non-whites,
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especially Africans, under the apartheid regime, the role of race in the income distribu-
tion has to be assessed. If there is not equal opportunity for all, race could possibly be
correlated with PREX and would be an error term that leads to biased results when not
accounted for.
In his estimations, Adams assumes that migrant and non-migrant households only differ
in the fact that the one receives remittances and the other one does not (Adams, 1991). In
his rather strict assumption, Adams (1991) states that “non-migrant and migrant house-
holds are not assumed to differ in any entrepreneurial or any other sense that might affect
their income in any manner apart from the relationships captured by the variables used in
the predicted income equations”. Whilst this assumption simplifies the model in a sense
that makes predicted income calculations much easier it runs the risk of simplifying it to a
degree where the model is not suitable to make reasonable predictions. This is especially
a concern given that time invariant differences between migrants and non-migrants have
often been established in the literature. Furthermore, Adams fails to further justify his
assumption.
For the reasons outlined above, this paper extends Adams methodology with the pur-
pose of correctly identifying non-remittance households that are similar to remittance
receiving households through propensity score matching. Propensity score matching is
the best alternative to construct a counterfactual given the structure of the data on re-
mittances. Other counterfactual estimations discussed in the beginning of this Section,
such as Barham and Boucher (1998), use a double selection model to account for selec-
tion bias. However, the exclusion restriction for double selection cannot be met given the
limited information available on remittance payers in the data. This will be discussed in
more detail together with other concerns regarding the data used in Section 4.2.
The counterfactual scenario estimated in this paper therefore uses information available
on households to match non-remittance households to remittance receiving households
based on the propensity score. Then equation (6) will be estimated for the matched
households in the control group. In a subsequent step, parameters obtained from this
first estimation will be applied to households that receive remittances in order to pre-
dict their income excluding remittances. Therefore, equation (6) will be run again on
remittance households but with the parameters obtained from the estimation of PREX
from matched non-remittances households. Through this process, income excluding remit-
tances is available not only for non-remittance households but also an estimated income
without remittances is obtained for remittance households. In a final step of this counter-
factual estimation, the Gini coefficient will be calculated for this newly obtained income
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distribution.
3.3 Propensity Score Matching and Difference in Difference Match-
ing Estimators
Propensity score matching is a widely used method to evaluate the effects of treatments
on participants compared to non-participants. The term ‘treatment’ thereby refers to
different economic policies and events. For example, Girma and Görg (2007) test the
effect of an acquisition of a company by a foreign multi-national enterprise using match-
ing estimators and Heckman et al. (1998) test their hypothesis on an experiment of a
job training program. In this paper, the treatment under observation is the reception of
remittances. Hence, households in the treatment group are those receiving remittances
and households in the control group are those that do not.
The principal idea of propensity score matching is to identify those individuals within
the group of non-participants that are similar to the individuals in the treatment group.
The criteria by which this similarity between the individuals in the two groups is deter-
mined are a set X of relevant pre-treatment characteristics. This process of establishing
an adequate control group is then used to ascertain the effect that can be solely assigned
to the treatment by comparing the differences in outcomes between the matched individ-
uals of the control and the treatment group. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the
propensity score as the predicted probability for participation given the set of observable
covariates X. Individuals are matched when they have the same propensity score. De-
tailed discussion of the assumptions and the theoretical background of propensity score
matching in general will follow in Section 3.4. Section 3.4.1 will then discuss Difference in
Difference matching specifically before Section 3.4.2 reviews different matching algorithms
applied in this paper.
3.4 Propensity Score Matching
Much of the literature on propensity matching focuses on the removal of biases and some
first literature on the issue of propensity score matching is by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). In their paper they discuss the instrumental role of propensity scores for causal
effects and focus in their analysis on observational studies. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
offer the technical background of an adjustment for the propensity score which is suitable
for removing biases in estimation strategies. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also provide
the fundamental steps to develop the t-test analytics applied later in this paper.
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) focus in their study more precisely on a char-
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acterization of selection bias. The authors utilize data that stems from an experiment on
a prototypical job training program. The authors can insure an “unusual richness”of the
data by combining data from the experiment with data from non-experimental compari-
son group. Heckman et al. (1998) succeed in proving the effectiveness of propensity score
matching in reducing conventional measures of bias. However, they fail to completely
remove bias from the estimations. The authors discuss the suitability of difference in
difference matching to remove the selection bias. They find that, if all assumptions are
satisfied by the data, bias can be reduced but not all bias can be removed.
In their paper on propensity score matching, Caliendo and Kopeining (2008) offer an
inclusive summary of the technical concerns regarding propensity score matching. They
not only discuss different matching methods but also offer in depth analysis on the model
choice and how the variables for matching should be chosen. In their paper they go be-
yond discussing the requirements for valid propensity score matching but offer theoretical
background on alternative matching methods if one assumption is not satisfied by the
data.
While these papers offer the necessary theoretical background on propensity score match-
ing, Ham, Li and Reagan (2005) actually implement propensity score matching to estimate
the effect of internal migration in the United States on the growth of real wages between
first and second jobs of movers. The authors apply propensity score matching in order
to deal with selection issues and to further examine how migration affects the growth
in wages of young male migrants. In their study, the authors not only instrumentalize
propensity scores but also implement a distance-base measure for migration to estimate
the effects of migration on wage growth. Ham et al. (2005) conclude that in their case
they are able to eliminate most of the permanent component of error in the outcome esti-
mation through the process of matching and differencing. Furthermore, the authors find
that migration positively affects wage growth for college graduates, however, migration
appears to have a marginally negative yet significant effect for high-school drop-outs.
Finally, Smith and Todd (2005) assess the ability of different evaluation methods of so-
cial programmes to overcome the problems of non-experimental estimations. The authors
re-estimate the work done by LaLonde (1986) as well as by Dehejia and Whaba (2002)
focussing on the implementation of cross-sectional as well as longitudinal variations of
propensity score matching estimators. Their findings show that earlier estimations by
LaLonde (1986) and Dehejia and Whaba (2002) respectively are strongly dependent on
the choice of subsamples in the data. Furthermore the results show strong sensitivity to
the variable choice for the estimation of the propensity score.
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Additionally to this assessment, Smith and Todd (2005) also offer a good derivation
of the methodology of propensity score matching in general and difference in difference
matching in particular. In their estimations, Smith and Todd (2005) find that difference
in difference matching estimators deliver better results than cross-sectional matching al-
gorithms. The authors also find that no such conclusion can be drawn with regards to
different matching algorithms. The results do not differ much between nearest neighbour
or local linear matching but are very much dependent on the data available, therefore
the data under observation should determine the choice of an evaluation method. Smith
and Todd (2005) conclude that propensity score matching is not the best estimator in
every case but can be suitable to reduce bias given that the assumptions are met by the
available data set.
The purpose of using propensity score matching in this paper is not to determine the
treatment effect of remittances but to identify a suitable group that can be used in the
prediction of income excluding remittances for remittance households. Therefore, the re-
mainder of this section will focus on the matching process instead of the evaluation of the
treatment effect. For this purpose, the principals and assumptions as well as the different
methods of propensity score matching that will be used in the later analysis are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
Propensity score matching requires two rather strict assumptions:
1. Unconfoundedness
2. Overlap
According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), Unconfoundedness can be formalized as




denotes independence and X is a set of observable covariates
and unaffected by the treatment. D is the treatment indicator, in this case a dummy
variable for the receipt of remittances. D is equal to 1 if a household receives remittances
and equal to 0 if not. The unconfoundedness assumptions requires that conditional on X
potential outcomes Y are independent of the assignment to treatment group. However,
this implies the very strong assumption that all variables that simultaneously influence
outcome as well as assignment can be observed by the researcher. Especially with migra-
tion, however, this may not be the case. As discussed earlier, Borjas (1991) found that
migrants may be characterized by a higher level of motivation or a higher willingness to
take on a risk. Such characteristics cannot be observed and are therefore not captured
in the data. Conditional difference in difference (DID) matching offers an alternative
estimation method for which this assumption does not have to be satisfied. The details
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about this method will be discussed shortly.
The second assumption that has to hold in order to justify propensity score matching
is the overlap or common support assumption. Formally written as 0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1,
the overlap condition states that individuals with the same values of covariates X are char-
acterized by a positive probability of being in the treatment group or in the control group.
Together, assumptions 1 and 2 are called ‘strong ignorability’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). However, Caliendo and Kopeining (2008) point out that the assumptions for
strong ignorability are overly strong and that what is commonly known as ‘CIA’, condi-
tional mean independence assumption, is sufficient to estimate average treatment effect
as well as average effect of the treatment on the treated. Conditional mean independence
requires that the outcome is independent of the treatment conditional on the propensity
score. Although this is a less strict requirement than strong ignorability, in the presence
of a selection bias this assumption does not hold either. Hence, the following section will
discuss conditional difference in difference estimations as an alternative that can be used
when unconfoundedness is not satisfied.
3.4.1 Difference in Difference Matching Estimators or Conditional Difference
in Difference
Heckman et al. (1998) are the first to suggest difference in difference matching. It has
the great advantage that the assumptions required by this conditional version are weaker
than those required by propensity score matching. Girma and Görg (2007) point out that
common matching estimators are often dissatisfactory. This is for example caused by
strong limitations due to assuming that all characteristics that need to be controlled for
are observable. Therefore, this paper utilizes conditional difference in difference matching
in order to correct for a selection bias in the estimation of a non-remittance counterfac-
tual. Heckman et al. (1998) discuss the effectiveness of difference in difference matching
and find it useful in the case where a time invariant bias is present that can be differenced
out. It can be assumed that the differences in characteristics of migration households are
constant over time. Therefore it is a suitable approach to take in the estimation of a
non-remittance counterfactual. Smith and Todd (2005) find that difference in difference
matching estimators are more robust than traditional cross-section matching estimators.
Difference in difference (DID) matching estimators or conditional DID matching can be
implemented easily in a panel or repeated cross-sectional data set. Therefore, the con-
ditional DID approach will be used to determine which non-remittance households are
similar to the ones receiving remittances. These matched households are the ones that
will be applied to Adams’ approach of predicting household income excluding remittances
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in the hope that selection bias in the estimation will be reduced in the results.
A DID matching estimator requires weaker assumptions than the matching estimators
explained above. The assumption of conditional mean independence is relaxed such that
it allows for unobservable and time invariant differences across groups of participants
and non-participants. However, the assumption of common support still has to hold.
Conditional DID matching was introduced by Heckman et al. (1998). Traditional differ-
ence in difference estimations and the related fixed effects estimations are commonly used
measures which this approach extends by conditioning outcomes on the propensity score.
Furthermore, differences are constructed using semi-parametric methods.
The matching process of conditional DID matching estimators can be explained as follows.
If REMit ∈ 0, 1 is an indicator of whether or not household i is receiving remittances
in time period t, then y1it+s denotes household income in period t + s, s ≥ 0 including
remittances and y0it+s denotes the household income in households that do not receive
remittances. The causal effect of remittances can then be derived by y1it+s − y0it+s. The
aim of the matching process is to estimate the counterfactual household income y0it+s for
households that received remittances in t + s, however for these households we can only
observe y1it+s. According to Girma and Görg (2007) this situation may be described as a
missing data problem. Alternatively to propensity score matching, the income of house-
holds had they not received remittances could be estimated by the average of the income
of non-remittance households. However, this would only be a valid estimation if there
were no other simultaneous effects that are associated with the receipt of remittance in-
come that are not controlled for. As explained above, it can be assumed that remittance
receiving households differ systemically. Therefore, it is important to select a valid control
group in order to reduce bias in the construction of the counterfactual. This paper aims
to achieve this by employing matching techniques.
The matching process involves pairing remittance receiving households with non-remittance
households based on an index of observables X. In this case, X is a vector of observable
covariates that include mean household age, number of household residents, number of
adults in the household, an indicator for the years of schooling in the household and a
number of indicators of the race of the household. The choice of variables is influenced by
what the literature on migration and remittances describes as determinants of migration
(see for example Barham and Boucher, 1998 or Adams, 1989). Propensity score match-
ing as defined inter alia by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) estimates the probability of
receiving a treatment, or in this case remittances, conditional on this set of observable
covariates X. Hence, the probability of receiving remittances, or the propensity score,
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can be defined as
P (REMit = 1) = F (Xit−1). (7)
The propensity score as defined in equation (7) is obtained using a non-linear model such
as probit or logit model, depending on the distributional assumptions on the error terms.
Let pi denote the thus defined probability for a household to receive remittances in the
group of remittance households R and pj the probability of receiving remittances for a
household in the control group C. As stated by Girma and Görg (2007), the standard











In equation (8), g(·) is a function to assign weights on the comparison household j while
constructing the counterfactual for household i. The different matching estimators ex-
plained in Section 3.4.2 differ in the weights assigned in this function g(·).
Conditional DID matching is a variation of this standard matching method in which
∆y denotes the difference in household income at the end of the panel and income in the











This estimator is conditional on the probit estimations for the propensity score and thus
on the set of observable characteristics X, hence “conditional difference in difference
matching”. These weights of the propensity score are dependent on the respective cross-
sectional matching algorithm used. Similar to equation (8), DID matching re-weights
observations according to the matching estimator’s weighting function g(·). Smith and
Todd (2005) argue the superiority of the conditional DID approach over its unconditional
counterparts as the estimation of the conditional outcome variable in this approach is free
of restrictions on linear functional form.
This paper will make use of DID matching to determine those non-remittance house-
holds that are most similar to households receiving remittances. Subsequently, these
matched non-remittance households will be used in the estimation of predicted income
excluding remittances (PREX) in the non-migration counterfactual. Implementing the
DID matching method to determine which households to use for the prediction of non-
remittance income is thought to reduce biases that arise in the estimations due to the fact
that time invariant differences like the selection bias between migrants and non-migrants
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are accounted for. The following paragraph will explain the different algorithms that this
paper utilizes for the matching process.
3.4.2 Different Matching Algorithms
Logit vs. Probit Matching
The most commonly used model in the estimation of propensity scores is a binary pro-
bit model. However, any discrete choice model can be used for the estimation according
to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). Principally, logit or probit models are preferred over
linear probability models as the functional form assumed in probit and logit models is
more eligible. The choice between logit and probit is less important as the two yield
very similar results for cases of a binary treatment although the distribution in the logit
estimation yields higher density masses at the margins. In the later estimation, both
logit and probit models will be implemented to test for robustness of the results against
different estimation methods.
Nearest Neighbour Matching
The method of nearest neighbour matching is the most straightforward of the different
matching methods according to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). An individual from the
control group is matched to an individual in the treatment group when it is closest in
terms of the propensity score. There are different methods of nearest neighbour matching.
Firstly, matching can be done with replacement; i.e. an individual from the comparison
group can be matched to more than one individual in the treatment group. When choosing
nearest neighbour matching with replacement, one has to decide on a trade off between
bias and variance. Matching with replacement will increase the matching quality and
decrease the bias. However, variance will increase due to the fact that the counterfactual
outcome is calculated with a reduced number of non-participants. Matching without re-
placement on the other hand does not face the problem of increased variance but requires
special caution with regards to the ordering of the matched observation. It is important to
make sure that this order is random in the matching process as nearest neighbour match-
ing without replacement is sensitive to this order. Smith and Todd (2005) discuss this
trade-off between bias and variance in more detail. Lastly, one disadvantage of nearest




As opposed to nearest neighbour, kernel matching is a non-parametric matching esti-
mator. Instead of matching one non-participant to many participants, Kernel matching
employs weighted averages of potentially all members of the comparison group in order to
establish the counterfactual outcome. This results in lower variance compared to nearest
neighbour matching as information of more individuals is used in the construction of the
counterfactual. However, as Kernel matching uses weighted averages of a large fraction of
the control group it is possible that these averages are calculated using observations that
are bad matches. Heckman et al. (1998) offer an extensive discussion of the theoretical
background of kernel matching. The fact that averages are calculated over large parts of
the groups of non-participants makes it imperative to carefully establish the condition of
common support explained above. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) explain that weights
used in the kernel method are “dependent on the distance between each individual from
the control group and the participant observation for which the counterfactual is esti-
mated”. The authors also stress that in the case where weights are implemented that
stem from a kernel that is uni-modal, symmetric and non-negative the derived averages
impose lower weights on matches that are more distant with regards to the propensity
score than weights imposed on those that show propensity scores closer to one another.
All matching procedures in this paper are done using nearest neighbour matching. How-
ever, kernel matching will be implemented to test for robustness. If matches found in the
data are of high quality, the different matching algorithms should yield similar results.
Further matching methods that will not be implemented in this paper include caliper or
radius matching as well as stratification or local linear matching. Section 5.2 will im-
plement the matching algorithms discussed above in order to determine the appropriate
control group of non-remittance households that can be used in the estimation of pre-
dicted income excluding remittances (PREX) discussed in this section. Section 4 will
now review the data used in the decomposition of the Gini coefficient and the creation of
a non-remittances counterfactual performed in Section 5.
4 Descriptive Statistics
This section discusses the data underlying the analysis in this paper and reviews the
descriptive statistics of the relevant variables used in later assessment regarding the Gini
coefficient in South Africa.
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4.1 Data
The data used in this paper stems from the panel data set of the National Income Dy-
namics Study (NIDS). The NIDS data set offers great detail in the information collected
on income from different sources and therefore is the suitable choice in the context of this
paper. The data has been collected from 2008 to 2012 in two-year intervals. NIDS is a
nationally representative study of South African individuals, this was achieved through
assigning probabilities to the different provinces according to size in the Master Sam-
ple of primary sampling units (PSU’s). This process was necessary in order to avoid a
concentration of the sample in a few provinces. The sampling was assigned to Statistics
South Africa and to draw the sample, a two-stage cluster sample design was implemented.
NIDS is the first panel data set for South Africa that collects information on individ-
uals of all ages. Individual’s information was collected mostly in private households but
the study also comprises individuals residing in convents or worker’s hostels. In the three
waves, information about labour market participation, individual and household income
from employment and non-employment sources as well as data on individual health and
education has been conducted. Attrition rates have improved across waves due to better
tracking in Wave 3 (NIDS, W3 User Manual). As such household attrition is at about
13% in Wave 2 and 10% in Wave 3. Individual level attrition is slightly higher due to
the fact that within a household some individuals may agree to an interview while others
refuse. Reasons for attrition may be interview refusal, on a household level or individual
level, not tracked, moved outside SA or deceased. Individual attrition levels are 19% in
Wave 2 and 16% in Wave 3.
4.2 Data Concerns
The main objective in this paper are different sources of income. For this purpose, the
derived income variables provided by NIDS2 will be used throughout the paper. These
derived income variables contain information on labour market income (wage), income
of a capital nature and investment sources, agricultural activities and implied rent. Fur-
thermore, income from remittances and government grants are included. All income is
derived as per month income. The variable on labour market income contains information
not only on the first paid job but also on any other paid jobs as well as self-employment
activities. In the case an individual earned an income from casual work, helping out a
friend or a 13th paycheck or any other bonuses, the wage variable comprises that infor-
mation as well. Investment income contains information on incomes from stocks, loans,
rentals, as well as private pensions and retirement annuities. The variable on income of a
capital nature contains a broad band of (mostly once-off) payment incomes such as labola
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(bridal payments), a monetary gift or inheritance, retrenchment payments as well as the
pay-back of a loan to the income receiving person. Income from agricultural activities
includes everything from the income from selling products of the land such as crops or
vegetables as well as animal products such as milk, eggs or wool. All agricultural income
is net of input costs which include for example the cost for labour and fertilizers or the
cost of feeding the animals. The implied rent variable is included to account for income
derived from owning a house or dwelling. It is constructed from the market value of the
property and a variable that captures the amount a family would be willing to pay in
order to occupy the dwelling that they currently own. However, when constructing this
variable, the different kind of home-owners and non-rent payers have to be taken into ac-
count. Firstly, there are families living in the dwelling of someone else that are not paying
rent. In the NIDS Technical Paper on household income in Wave 1 (Argent, 2009), these
people are described to be constituting an income from the use of a dwelling by not paying
for it. Hence, the implied rent variable takes the market value for those occupied dwellings
as the rent implied although no actual rent is paid. Furthermore, the people who actually
own the home their families occupy are separated into two categories, the ones with a
mortgage on their dwelling and the ones without. While this has different effects on their
expenditure, home-owners with and without are treated the same in terms of implied rent
which equals the market rental price. This value is thought to be captured by asking3 for
the amount of rent the individual thinks could be collected were the place to be rented
out. However, any such question may lead to biased results. Implied rent is therefore
a slightly problematic variable but it will nevertheless be included in the later analysis
of income sources due to its importance in the income decomposition. The variable on
government grants captures any incomes received through state pension funds, grants for
disability, children, foster children or care dependency. Furthermore, “other government
grants”include income from the unemployment insurance fund and workman’s compen-
sation. Lastly, the derived variable on income from remittances not only contains the
monetary contributions a household receives from a distant remitter but also the values
stated of contributions in kind. All income variables applied in the following analysis are
used in per capita terms. Per capita values are calculated using the number of household
residents. A resident is defined as someone who spends at least 4 nights a week in the
household and is not away from the household for more than three months a year. Op-
posed to residents, there are also household members. These are individuals associated
with the household but spending more time away than the given thresholds. Household
members could possibly be remittance payers, however, this study does not analyse the
role of household members any further.
A migrant household is strictly one that receives remittances. Although possibly not
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the best definition of a migrant household, the quality of the data given demands such
definition seeing that the purpose of this paper is the analysis of the role of remittances.
Given the definition of household members and residents according to the criteria out-
lined above, households that report a member being away, for work or in the search of
work often do not report an income from remittances and vice versa, not every household
that receives remittances reports a household member away. In many cases, households
do not report detailed information on the person sending remittances beyond the income
received. Therefore it is not possible to gain further information on the remitters in the
majority of cases. For the further analysis in this paper, this definition of a migrant
household also implies the rather strict assumption that any remitter has been a member
of the remittance receiving household and this household sent the migrant away.
Lastly, the analysis in this paper categorizes households into urban and rural households
according to the geographic variables in the 2011 Census that are included in NIDS. The
Census data reports households in three different geographical regions. These different
geotypes include urban areas, farms and regions labelled “traditional”. This is a new def-
inition compared to the 2001 Census geotypes that saw urban formal and urban informal
areas as well as rural formal and tribal authority geotypes. For the rest of the paper,
rural areas comprise all households situated in traditional or farm areas on the one hand
and urban areas on the other.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics in per capita values for the relevant variables that
are used in the later analysis of the Gini coefficient. Although NIDS is a panel data set,
this paper will exploit the repeated cross-sectional characteristics of the data. Therefore,
all variables are reviewed separately for the different waves. Number of observations (N),
mean and standard deviation for components of household income are reported in Table
1. The mean of total household income per capita increases from ZAR 1198.7 in Wave 1
to ZAR 2028.95 in Wave 3. Seeing that overall household income increases in the observed
time span, most income sources increase as well. For example, income from labour market
activities increases from ZAR 635 in Wave 1 to ZAR 914 in Wave 2 and ZAR 1186 in Wave
3. The large share of labour market income in overall income already becomes apparent.
Income from remittances in per capita terms first decreases from ZAR 48 in Wave 1 to
ZAR 39.5 in Wave to before it increases to ZAR 77.3 in Wave 3. The different numbers
of observation reflect the handling of non-responses in the data. All income sources are
reported separately in Table 1 to allow the reader a deeper understanding of the underlying
income components. However, income from different sources will be grouped together for
the later decomposition exercise. As such, all income from government grants will be
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Household Income Components
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
WAVE 1
HH Income 7212 1198.77 7769.189
Labour Income 7212 634.7445 1893.82
Government Grants 7212 146.8864 203.0866
Other Government Grants 7212 3.333955 59.96827
Investment 7212 51.45503 481.6339
Capital 7212 138.8342 6878.765
Remittances 7212 47.93394 236.2791
Implied Rent 6538 190.9847 491.0229
Agriculture 1655 10.78338 57.58349
WAVE 2
HH Income 6495 1561.217 7267.143
Labour Income 6495 914.4204 3080.15
Government Grants 6495 180.9422 252.1437
Other Government Grants 6495 2.404023 49.3447
Investment 6495 75.56537 686.6517
Capital 6495 118.1125 6341.453
Remittances 6495 39.53614 438.4983
Implied Rent 6409 242.0276 743.0446
Agriculture 6495 13.19709 639.8328
WAVE 3
HH Income 6865 2028.949 12208.21
Labour Income 6865 1185.539 2680.929
Government Grants 6865 210.784 301.3488
Other Government Grants 6865 3.879027 84.4851
Investment 6865 100.9149 1061.168
Capital 6865 193.8813 11587.67
Remittances 6865 77.29944 783.0679
Implied Rent 6306 277.7176 929.5288
Agriculture 6865 15.00476 477.1017
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reported as one category. Furthermore, income from investment and capital sources will
be reported together and income from labour market as well as agricultural activities will
be analyzed as one variable. This allows to focus on the few income categories of interest
in this paper as the decomposition exercise serves to examine the role of remittances in
the income distribution in South Africa.
Additionally, Table 2 gives information about characteristics of the households such as
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Household Characteristics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev.
WAVE 1
HH Size 7297 5.925449 150.1603
HH Assets 5711 7.331933 3.80167
Mean Age 7297 29.52241 16.35262
No. of Adults 7297 1.734411 1.51732
Mean Education 7296 9.773163 3.485987
African 7297 .6639715 .4723811
Coloured 7297 .11909 .3239166
White 7297 .0501576 .218285
Asian/Indian 7297 .0106893 .1028422
Number of HH’s receiving remittances 2658
WAVE 2
HH Size 7117 4.507517 2.91882
HH Assets 4784 8.084681 3.775879
Mean Age 7117 23.75067 17.29908
No. of Adults 7117 2.032598 1.346849
Mean Education 6062 10.23111 3.039128
African 7117 .7671772 .42266
Coloured 7117 .1265983 .3325458
White 7117 .0303499 .1715602
Asian Indian 7117 .0091331 .0951363
Number of HH’s receiving remittances 2831
WAVE 3
HH Size 8156 4.260544 2.836033
HH Assets 8156 6.242819 5.658522
Mean Age 8156 24.83785 16.80638
No. of Adults 8156 1.883276 7.715582
Mean Education 7250 10.46041 2.977154
African 8156 .8064002 .3951431
Coloured 8156 .1227317 .3281491
White 8156 .0290584 .1679805
Asian Indian 8156 .0093183 .0960864
Number of HH’s receiving remittances 2867
mean age and mean level of education. Level of education is measured by years of schooling
that range from 0 to 12. However, post-schooling information is added to include post-
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school diplomas, NTC’s as well as any tertiary education. For these certificates, the
measurement ranges from 13 to 17, whereas 17 is a PhD degree. For the remainder of
this paper, whenever the estimation of predicted income excluding remittances refers to
the education variable, it speaks about this mean level of household education. Mean
household education is calculated as the mean of the years of schooling of all household
members. Furthermore, Table 2 reports the number of household residents, i.e. the size of
the household, as well as the number of adults residing in the home. Household size as well
as number of adult are theorized as having a positive influence on sending out migrants.
Firstly because as the number of residents increases so does the likelihood of one going
away. Additionally, if there is a larger number of adults left in the households, they are able
to compensate the loss of the migrant’s assistance in the household. Hence, the household
faces lower opportunity costs. The number of adults is added as the composition of a
household is theorized to have an influence on migration status as well as mean household
age. The age average of all household members is included in the calculations as younger
household may be more willing to take the risk of sending out a migrant than households
with a higher number of older members. Table 2 also reports a set of race indicators
included in the estimation. The race for a household is determined by the mode of the
race of the individuals; the mode is the value occurring most frequently. The household
race variable is also provided in the derived variables of NIDS. For all three waves, African
households dominate all other household race dummies. Interestingly, their share seems
to be increasing. The second most common are coloured whose share is stagnant over
time and the least common are Asian and Indian households. Furthermore, a variable
was created that reports the log values of the assets that the household owns. Included
in the variable for household assets are vehicle assets, such as the value of a car or truck
owned for private or economic use (work). Furthermore, livestock assets such as cattle,
chicken or sheep are included. Lastly and most importantly, the asset value of property or
a dwelling owned are included. This is measured by the log of the market value stated by
the individuals. In most cases this variable comprises the largest share in the household
asset variable. However, as can be seen from the fluctuating number of observation,
information on household assets is not easily obtained. The problematic of this issue has
been discussed in the previous subsection. The variables presented in Table 2 will be
relevant in the construction of the counterfactual.
5 Results
After the descriptive statistics have been discussed in the previous section, this section
uses the NIDS data set to analyze levels of inequality in South Africa by decomposing
the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality according to income sources. Furthermore,
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the data will be used to create a counterfactual that allows the assessment of levels of
inequality that would have prevailed had migration not taken place.
5.1 Decomposition of the Gini
This section presents the decomposed Gini coefficients for different sources of income for
South African households in 2008, 2010 and 2012 (NIDS Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3).
Gini coefficients are calculated using per capita income of households.
In Table 3, household income is decomposed into five different sources. The first in-
come variable noted is labour incomes. It is a sum of all wage income in per capita
terms. That indicates, incomes from the main job as well as any second jobs, bonuses as
well as self-employment and other wage income are included. Furthermore, this variable
comprises any income from subsistence agricultural activities as well as from consuming
what is produced by the household. Government grants include state old age pension
funds, incomes from disability grants and child support grants as well as foster care and
care dependency grants. A small number of households reported income from unemploy-
ment insurance funds (UIF) and workman’s compensation which are also included in this
income variable. Furthermore, income from remittances, the variable of interest in this
paper, is included and lastly, income from implied rent is covered. NIDS constructed a
derived variable for implied rent in order to take into account the income a family derives
from home ownership in the form of not having to pay rent. The capital variable covers
incomes from investment, i.e. interest or dividend generating incomes, such as private
pension funds and retirement annuities as well as stocks, loans and rentals but also in-
comes of a capital nature. This includes inheritance income, bridal payments such as the
traditional “labola”and other monetarist gifts. However, also the kind of income that is
generated when receiving the repayment of a loan to the person and received income from
sale of household goods are interpreted as capital income. Finally, the variable for capital
includes an assembly of different kinds of incomes such as the war veterans pension that
does neither fit into another category nor do many people receive income from such a
source. The fact that the income variable ‘Capital’ comprises income from this many
sources explains the relatively high share of income from this source in overall income.
The decomposition exercise4 shows that income inequality in South Africa is still stag-
nating. The overall Gini coefficients across all three waves are at about 0.64 with a mild
increase in Wave 2 to 0.648. Table 3 firstly reports the decomposition into different in-
come sources for Wave 1. The share s reports the share of the respective source of income
in the overall household income. Labour market income is the biggest source of income
for all three waves and fluctuates around 55 percent. Remittance income remains almost
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the same in its share in overall income at about 3.5 percent in Wave 1, 2.4 percent in
Wave 2 and about 3.2 percent in Wave 3. Given that the income variables on government
grants and capital comprise income from several sources it is not surprising that Table 3
reports a relatively large share in total income for government grants and capital income
respectively. Lastly, the variable on implied rent income reports a relatively large share
as well, with up to 17% in Wave 2 and around 14% in Wave 1 and Wave 3.
In the second column, g reports the Gini coefficient of the respective income source.
Table 3: Gini Decomposition into Income Components
Share Coeff. Corr. Contri. %Contri. Elasticity
Variable s g r s*g*r s*g*r/G s*g*r/G-s
Wave 1
Labour Income 0.5522 0.7713 0.9307 0.3964 0.6155 0.0633
Government Grants 0.1157 0.6194 0.1058 0.0076 0.0118 -0.1039
Remittances 0.0348 0.9360 0.4517 0.0147 0.0228 -0.0120
Implied Rent 0.1407 0.6796 0.7930 0.0758 0.1177 -0.0230
Capital 0.1566 0.9924 0.9623 0.1496 0.2322 0.0756
Total HH Income 1.0000 0.6441 - 0.6441 1.0000 -
Wave 2
Labour Income 0.5688 0.8199 0.9255 0.4316 0.6658 0.0970
Government Grants 0.1394 0.6250 0.1956 0.0170 0.0263 -0.1131
Remittances 0.0241 0.9648 0.5051 0.0118 0.0181 -0.0060
Implied Rent 0.1772 0.7426 0.8468 0.1114 0.1719 -0.0053
Capital 0.0906 0.9793 0.8620 0.0764 0.1179 0.0274
Total HH Income 1.0000 0.6482 - 0.6482 1.0000 -
Wave 3
Labour Income 0.5401 0.7769 0.9188 0.3855 0.6016 0.0615
Government Grants 0.1222 0.6218 0.1000 0.0076 0.0119 -0.1103
Remittances 0.0322 0.9434 0.4390 0.0133 0.0208 -0.0114
Implied Rent 0.1481 0.7106 0.8263 0.0870 0.1357 -0.0124
Capital 0.1575 0.9903 0.9455 0.1475 0.2301 0.0726
Total HH Income 1.0000 0.6408 - 0.6408 1.0000 -
Across all three waves, these Gini coefficients are rather high. The Gini coefficient of
remittance income is between 0.94 and up to 0.96 in the three waves. As a majority of
households report zero income from remittances, a high level of inequality within this
income source would be expected. Similar holds true for income from capital and invest-
ment sources. These mechanisms are not available to everyone and hence, high levels of
inequality within these sources and a Gini above 0.97 in all waves are to be expected.
The lowest Gini is reported for income from government grants, although government
grants still report Gini coefficients of about 0.62. Therefore, income from this source is
rather unequal as well. However, the biggest concerns should stem from the steep level of
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inequality within the largest income source, labour income. Since labour income makes
up such a large share in overall household incomes, high levels of inequality in this vari-
able have more severe effects on overall inequality. This can also be seen in the following
columns of Table 3.
The third column reports the Gini correlation r of income from the respective source
with the distribution of total household income. This correlation coefficient will be zero
if the respective source of income k and total income are independent. In the same way, r
will be equal to 1 or -1 if income source k is an increasing or decreasing function of overall
income. Most of the income sources under observation report a rather strong positive
correlation with overall income. For example income from labour sources reports a cor-
relation with overall inequality of 0.93 for Wave 1 and Wave 2 and 0.92 for Wave 3. This
supports the concern about the steep level of inequality within this income component as
it appears to be a driving force of overall inequality in South Africa. The income source
with the lowest correlation is income from government grants which reports a correlation
of only about 0.1 for Wave 1 and Wave 3, however in Wave 2 it reports a correlation al-
most twice as high with 0.19. This can be explained by the fact that grants should mainly
benefit households at the bottom end of the income distribution and should therefore not
be strongly associated with overall inequality. Remittances report an r of 0.45 in Wave
1, 0.5 in Wave 2 and 0.44 in Wave 3.
In the next column, the contribution of the respective source to the Gini coefficient of
overall household income is reported in absolute values and the second last column re-
ports the contribution in percentage terms. The second last column emphasizes that the
distribution of wages play an important role in overall inequality. This was to be expected
given that they make up such a big share in overall income. The percentage contribution
of inequality in the labour market income to overall income inequality is about 61 per-
cent for Wave 1 but increases to about 67 percent in Wave 2 only to fall back to about
60 percent in Wave 3. Remittances on the other hand make up a rather small part of
the overall income inequality; their contribution is around 2 percent for all three waves.
Government grants also report only a small contribution to the overall Gini coefficient
with 1.2 percent in Wave 1, 2.6 percent in Wave2 and 1.2 percent in Wave 3.
Finally, the last column in Table 3 holds important information for the analysis of the
different income components. There the elasticity SkGkRk/G−Sk is reported or in other
words the effect of a 1% change in the respective income source on the overall Gini coef-
ficient holding income from all other sources constant. Changes in wage income as well
as income from capital sources seem to have the largest positive effects on the overall in-
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come inequality. A minor increase in both these income sources would lead to an increase
in overall income inequality. The effect of a marginal increase in labour market income
ranges from an increase in overall inequality of about 0.06 percent in Wave 1 and 3 up
to an inequality increasing effect of 0.09 percent in Wave 2. Similarly, a minor increase
in capital income would lead to an increase in the overall Gini coefficient of about 0.07
percent for Wave 1 and Wave 3. In Wave 2 however, a 1% increase in capital income
would only lead to an increase in overall inequality of about 0.026 percent. Income from
remittances has a negative effect on overall inequality. If remittances increase by 1%,
overall inequality will decrease by 0.012 percent in Wave 1 and 0.011 in Wave 3. For
Wave 2, the Gini coefficient would only decrease by 0.006 percent if income from remit-
tances would increase by 1%. Hence, it can be assumed that remittances primarily flow
towards households near the lower end of the income distribution, lifting them up and
improving general inequality. This has implications for economic policy as well. Policies
that make migration easier may lead to an increase in remittance payments. The largest
negative effect on overall inequality stems from income from government grants. When
income from this source increases by 1%, the overall Gini coefficient would decrease by
0.10 percent in Wave 1 and 0.11 percent in Wave 2 and Wave 3. This result stresses the
role of government and economic policy in reducing inequality in South Africa. It supports
that grants are favouring those households at the bottom end of the income distribution
and should therefore be continued. Lastly, implied rent has a negative elasticity as well.
However, like income from remittances the effect is rather small. A marginal increase in
implied rent would lead to a decrease of about 0.02 percent in Wave 1, 0.007 in Wave 2
and 0.012 in Wave 3. Despite these small effects, increased home ownership could also
lead to a reduction in present levels of inequality. This could be achieved for example by
following the government’s plan to increase housing available in the townships but also in
other places and by improving channels that ease access to home ownership in general.
The decomposition exercise in this subsection has highlighted the inequality reducing
effects of remittances. However, the decomposition of the Gini coefficient according to
income sources has also shown the strong influence of labour income and government
grants on overall inequality as well as the effect of income from a number of capital and
investment sources. The counterfactual scenario that will be created in the subsequent
paragraphs aims at testing the effect of remittances by assessing the levels of inequality
that would have occurred if there were no remittance payments. It can be assumed that
households without remittances compensate this lack in income from one source by in-
creasing income from other sources. Therefore, the counterfactual scenario that will be
created in this paper matches non-remittance households to remittance receiving house-
holds using propensity score matching. Using information on matched households, a new
income distribution will be estimated. This exercise is necessary as simply excluding re-
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mittances as an income source would not account for the compensation from other income
sources mentioned. Hence, such an estimation would lead to a bias in the results. The
counterfactual estimated in this paper tries to reduce such bias. The following subsection
will explain the process and the results of the counterfactual in more detail.
5.2 Results of the Counterfactual Analysis
The counterfactual that will be presented in this subsection was created by matching
remittance and non-remittance households in a conditional difference in difference (DID)
matching estimation. The non-remittance households that were thus identified to be-
ing similar to remittance receiving households are used to estimate predicted household
income excluding remittances (abbreviated with PREX). Subsequently, the parameters
obtained in this estimation will be applied to remittance receiving households to determine
how the income distribution would have looked like had these households not received re-
mittances. The detailed results of this procedure will be discussed in the remainder of
this section.
5.2.1 Conditional Difference in Difference Matching
All matching procedures are done separately for rural and urban households. The neces-
sity for this separate process arises due to the fact that matching requires to compare
individuals in the same economic environments (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2008). In other
words, for the matching to be successful, it is important to compare similar groups in
treatment and control. As such, not differentiating between urban and rural households
would lead to less robust matching results. Heckman et al. (1998) stress the point that
comparing incomparable groups may contribute considerably to selection bias measured.
In a first step, difference in difference matching estimators are created by using the nearest
neighbour method. For this, a probit estimation was run to determine the probability of
a household to receive remittances. Based on this, the propensity scores were estimated
which were then utilized in the conditional DID matching estimator. The entire process of
conditional DID matching will be done using logit as well as probit algorithms to ensure
the results obtained are robust against the use of different matching methods. Table 4
presents the results of the probit and logit estimations of equation (7). To recall, equation
P (REMit = 1) = F (Xit−1)
estimates the probability of receiving remittances based on a set of observable covari-
ates X. Hence, the probit as well as the logit estimation was run on a binary variable
that observes the reception of remittances. Tested was the effect of different observable
covariates that are assumed to affect whether a family will send a migrant or not. As
36
Table 4: Probit vs Logit Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Rural Probit Urban Logit Rural Logit Urban
1 = Receiption of Remittances
Household Income (ln) 0.0764∗∗∗ -0.0318∗ 0.125∗∗∗ -0.0510∗
(5.25) (-1.98) (5.27) (-1.97)
Number of Household 0.0543∗∗∗ 0.0600∗∗∗ 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0951∗∗∗
Residents (8.15) (6.36) (8.01) (6.26)
Mean Household Age -0.00977∗∗∗ -0.00167 -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.00283
(-6.25) (-1.00) (-6.31) (-1.04)
No. of Adults -0.0653∗∗∗ 0.00234 -0.105∗∗∗ 0.00641
(-4.89) (0.14) (-4.86) (0.24)
Mean Household 0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0280∗∗∗ 0.0490∗∗∗
Education (3.59) (4.57) (3.64) (4.55)
African -0.152 0.0384 -0.240 0.0614
(-1.61) (0.45) (-1.58) (0.45)
Coloured -0.792∗∗∗ 0.0681 -1.307∗∗∗ 0.106
(-7.32) (0.78) (-7.38) (0.76)
Asian Indian 0.198 -0.239 0.327 -0.403
(1.30) (-1.63) (1.33) (-1.68)
White -0.354 -0.279∗ -0.566 -0.462∗∗
(-1.95) (-2.55) (-1.93) (-2.59)
Constant -0.579∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.935∗∗∗ -0.861∗∗∗
(-4.02) (-3.59) (-4.02) (-3.59)
Observations 12833 9557 12833 9557
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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was to be expected, the two different algorithms do not differ much in the results and
for all variables the estimations show the same signs. The set of covariates X includes
a number of observed variables, such as the number of adults in a household and mean
age of the household. In urban areas, the number of adults in a household as well as the
mean age are not significant. The variable on household age captures the effect of mean
age in the household, it is significant on a 1%-level for rural families. Mean household
age thereby has a negative effect, i.e. the older the mean age of a household, the less like
this household is to send out a migrant and receive remittances. Although statistically
insignificant, mean age also has a negative sign for urban households.
The variable that captures the effect of the number of adults, i.e. the number of house-
hold members that are 18 years or older, is significant in rural households and also has a
negative effect. This implies that the probability of receiving remittances as an additional
income is less when households report a higher number of possibly income earning adults.
For all households the variable that captures income is significant. Interestingly, the vari-
able has a positive sign for rural households but a negative sign for urban households.
This implies that while rural household are more likely to receive remittances with higher
incomes, urban households are less likely to receive remittances when they receive high
overall household incomes. Logically, rural households are only able to send out migrants
if they have a high enough income to accommodate possible migration costs. Households
with lower incomes in rural areas may lack the means to migrate. Urban households, how-
ever, have little incentive to send out migrants when they already have a high household
income. Therefore urban high-income households are less likely to receive remittances
relative to urban low-income households that might expect higher income through re-
mittances. To check for robustness of this linear relationship of income, a second probit
and logit estimation was run including a squared income term. However, the results on
this variable are insignificant. Therefore, the squared income term was excluded in the
estimations reported in Table 4.
Furthermore, the mean level of education is significant on a 1%-level for all households
and has a positive sign. Therefore, the higher the mean level of education, the more likely
it is for a household to receive remittances. It is important to notice that the categorical
variables that were included in order to control for race show very mixed results. Overall,
race does not seem to be very significant in this estimation. For rural households, only the
bivariate variable for coloured households is significant, for urban households the variable
indicating a white household is. In both cases the significant variables report negative
effects on the reception of remittances. All in all, differences between logit and probit
models can be neglected, as for every variable tested the two estimation methods report
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variables with the same sign and comparable values.
The propensity scores for the matching process were calculated based on the probit model
reported in Table 4 for nearest neighbour and kernel matching.5 Additionally, the results
of the logit estimation model will be applied to nearest neighbour matching to test whether
the different estimation models affect the matching. The propensity score thereby reports
the probability to receive remittances conditional on the set of covariates X discussed
previously. The methodology of the matching process has been discussed in detail in
Section 3.2. The conditional difference in difference matching process was employed on
the differences in household income between the first and the last observation period in











Hence, the probit as well as the logit estimations are used to calculate the propensity
scores on the difference in household income in 2012 (NIDS Wave 3) and 2008 (NIDS
Wave 1) in the equation above. These propensity scores are then used to match house-
holds according to equation (9). The results of these matching processes for the probit
estimations are represented in Figures 1 and 2 as well as Tables 5 and 6.
Figures 1 and 2 serve to report on the quality of the processes for nearest neighbour
matching. As mentioned previously, propensity score matching is only possible if certain
assumptions hold. One of these assumptions is common support. If this assumption was
violated in the data, Figures 1 and 2 would report those propensity scores of households
that are not supported. However, in this estimation the matching shows good balancing
in the results and all households satisfy the assumption of common support. Propensity
scores for the treated households are reported in white in the top half of the figure, the
bottom half reports the propensity scores for untreated households in grey. Then, house-
holds from the treatment and control group were matched based on this propensity score
using nearest neighbour matching. As can be seen from the figures, the matching process
is successful for the majority of the treated households. Only in one case on the extreme
ends of the propensity scores no match can be found in the control group for rural house-
holds. The fact that the two halves of the figures are balanced relatively well confirms
the successful matching process. Similar holds true for the matching using the kernel
algorithm and when the propensity score is estimated using a logit model. Figures 3 to 6
display these matching outputs in the appendix.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the level of balancing achieved can also be
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Figure 1: Nearest Neighbour Probit Matching - Rural Households
Figure 2: Nearest Neighbour Probit Matching - Urban Households
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tested by running a t-test after the matching was performed. This test is suitable to
check whether there are significant differences between both groups with regards to the
means of the covariates. Before matching, differences would be expected but after the
matching, there should not be any significant differences. Tables 5 and 6 report to which
Table 5: Results of the t-test after ps matching - Rural Households
Mean %reduct
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
HH Income (ln) Unmatched 7.6174 7.513 11.7
Matched 7.6174 7.6239 -0.7 93.8
HH Size Unmatched 6.8904 5.918 29.1
Matched 6.8904 6.4299 13.8 52.6
Mean Age Unmatched 23.48 26.268 -28.0
Matched 23.48 23.838 -3.6 87.2
No. of Adults Unmatched 3.0541 2.8515 12.5
Matched 3.0541 2.8736 11.1 10.9
HH Education Unmatched 10.22 9.7146 18.4
Matched 10.22 10.248 -1.0 94.4
African Unmatched .94705 .90515 16.1
Matched .94705 .90716 15.3 4.8
Coloured Unmatched .0224 .07026 -22.9
Matched .0224 .01222 4.9 78.7
Asian Indian Unmatched .01103 .00698 4.3
Matched .01103 .01544 -4.7 -9.0
White Unmatched .00458 .00727 -3.5
Matched .00458 .00458 0.0 100.0
Pseudo R2 Matched 0.017
N Treated 5,892
Untreated 6,874
extent balancing has been achieved on the matched households for the nearest neighbour
method. When analyzing Tables 5 and 6, the mean reported for the respective variables of
the matched subsamples is the most important feature to interpret. Matching can be seen
as successful where the characteristics of the matched households of treatment and con-
trol group are similar. For all variables these means differ only minimally leading to the
conclusion that matching was successful. For example, in Table 5 rural households report
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Table 6: Results of the t-test after ps matching - Urban Households
Mean %reduct
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
HH Income (ln) Unmatched 8.0913 8.0701 2.0
Matched 8.0913 8.0471 4.2 -108.8
HH Size Unmatched 5.7691 4.8921 30.8
Matched 5.7691 5.6339 4.7 84.6
Mean Age Unmatched 26.039 27.988 -18.5
Matched 26.039 26.501 -4.4 76.3
No. of Adtults Unmatched 3.0967 2.7545 22.3
Matched 3.0967 3.0915 0.3 98.5
HH Education Unmatched 11.08 10.803 11.6
Matched 11.08 11.228 -6.2 46.3
African Unmatched .67755 .65966 3.8
Matched .67755 .70135 -5.1 -33.1
Coloured Unmatched .26847 .24986 4.2
Matched .26847 .24123 6.2 -46.4
Asian Indian Unmatched .00883 .01521 -5.8
Matched .00883 .00589 2.7 53.8
White Unmatched .0292 .05894 -14.5
Matched .0292 .01791 5.5 62.0




a mean of the treatment group for the variable that captures household age of 23.5 years
compared to 23.8 years in the control group. Therefore good balancing was achieved for
this variable. A little less well balanced but still acceptable is the variable that captures
the number of residents in a household. For rural households that receive remittances, the
average number of household members is 6.89 and households in the control group show
on average 6.4 household members. Nevertheless, this is a minor difference that does not
throw off the balancing of the matching. Similar holds true for the balancing of the re-
maining set of covariates for rural households. Results for urban households as displayed
in Table 6 are equally well balanced. For example the mean household size for matched
urban households is 5.7 for remittance households and 5.6 for non-remittance households.
These levels are slightly below the mean size of rural households. Urban households also
report on average older households. Households receiving remittances thereby report a
mean age of 26 years. Matched households that do not receive remittances report a mean
age of 26.5 years. All in all, all covariates are well balanced for urban households as well.
Additionally to the mean values of the different covariates, Tables 5 and 6 further
report the relative differences in the covariates between matched and unmatched house-
holds. The column (%bias) shows that an excessive reduction in the differences between
the two groups was achieved for all but the African race indicator for rural households.
This indicator shows a small reduction in bias, however when looking at the mean values
reported for treatment and control group of matched households, the two values are fairly
the same. Treated households report a mean of 0.947 and control households a mean
of 0.907. Thus the small bias reduction should be of little concern. For example, the
differences in household education levels dropped from 18.4% to 1% for rural households.
For urban households the relative reduction in differences was also quite successful. The
African race indicator for example changed from 11.6% to -6.2%. In the case of urban
households this kind of reduction in relative bias was achieved for most covariates. The
relative reduction in this bias is reported in the next column (%reduct. bias). The higher
the relative reduction, the more bias was reduced through matching. For example, the
variable for household income in Table 5 reports a relative reduction in bias of 93.8%.
This means that almost all bias was eliminated through matching.
Most variables report rather large values in this column, confirming the good balanc-
ing of the matching. Finally, Tables 5 and 6 state the number of treated and untreated
households that were matched and the pseudo-R2. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) suggest
a re-estimation of the propensity score only on the matched households in treatment and
control group. Then the pseudo-R2 serves as an indicator for how well the set of covariates
X explains the probability of receiving remittances. As the distribution of the covariates
should report no systematic differences between the treatment and control group, the
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pseudo-R2 should be rather low. Therefore, a pseudo-R2 of 0.017 for urban households
and 0.007 for rural households respectively indicates that matching has successfully taken
care of any systematic differences across the two groups. Similar holds true for kernel and
logit estimations. Results of the t-test for kernel matching and the logit estimation are
reported in Tables 10 to 13 in the appendix.
This section has presented the results of propensity score matching when it is applied
to rural and urban households in the NIDS data set. For this reason, probit and logit
model of the probability to receive remittances were estimated. The propensity scores
thus estimated were then employed in nearest neighbour and kernel matching on a condi-
tional difference in difference estimator. The good balancing achieved by these matching
algorithms was supported by the results of the t-test as well as the pseudo-R2. In the
following subsection, non-remittance households thus matched will be used to estimate
the household income of remittance households had they not received those payments.
5.2.2 Estimation of Predicted Income Excluding Remittances
The results discussed in the previous section support the quality of the matching process.
In this section the households thus matched will now be used to predict the counterfactual
income excluding remittances for otherwise remittance receiving households. Equation (6)
displayed below was discussed in section 3.2.
PREX = HH ASSET + EDUC +HHSIZE +GEOTY PE +HHRACE
This subsection will first estimate equation (6) for the matched households of the non-
remittance control group. The coefficients of this estimation will then be applied to the
remittance receiving households to predict their income in the counterfactual scenario
of no remittances. Utilizing this newly obtained information on household income, the
counterfactual Gini coefficient will be calculated to be able to compare the results of the
counterfactual with the actual results.
Tables 7 and 8 report the regression of equation (6) on matched households that do
not receive remittances for Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3. Variables used in the regression
are the log of household assets, the number of years of schooling, number of household
residents as well a variable that indicates race. Although equation (6) states GEOTY PE
as a covariate, this variable was left out in the estimation. Instead equation (6) was es-
timated separately for rural and urban households as a necessary consequence from the
separate propensity score matching. As explained earlier, the propensity score matching
had to be run separately for rural and urban households in order to avoid comparing the
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incomparable (Heckman et al., 1998).
For each of these separate estimations of equation (6), standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. For all three waves, most of these variables are significant for the regression.
The only exception is the number of household residents for urban households in Wave
1. The number of observations reported is the number of matched households that do
not receive remittances. Income excluding remittances is estimated in Rand values and
not in log values as the Rand value is needed to calculate the Gini in the next step of
the creation of the counterfactual. Table 7 shows that for urban households, the sum of
household assets is significant on a 1%-level for all three waves and has a positive effect
on income excluding remittances. Hence, income is increasing with household assets. In
Wave 1, this effect is the strongest. The mean level of education is also significant on
a 1%-level and has positive values for all three waves. The mean level of education is
thereby more significant in Wave 3. The positive sign of the education variable implicates
that higher educated individuals in a household are more likely to contribute more posi-
tively to overall household income, this can be associated to the fact that higher levels of
education are generally rewarded with higher returns to skill. The number of household
residents has ambiguous effects on household income excluding remittances. In Wave 1,
the variable is insignificant for urban households. In Wave 2 and Wave 3, the number of
residents is significant on a 5%-level, however, it has a positive effect in Wave 2 and a
negative effect in Wave 3. Finally, a variable capturing race is significant on a 1%-level
and positive for all three waves. To recall, the race indicator is 1 for African households
and 4 for white households. The indicator has a strong positive effect for urban households.
Table 8 reports the result of the estimation of income excluding remittances for matched
rural households. Again, the race indicator has a strong positive effect on income. In
rural households, the number of household residents has a positive effect on income and
is significant in all three waves. Hence, the more residents, the higher the income of the
household. Both household assets as well as level of education have a positive effect on
household income in rural areas. With the exception of the number of household residents
in Wave 2, which is significant at a 5%-level, all variables are significant on a 1%-level.
The coefficients obtained from the estimations displayed in Tables 7 and 8 are subse-
quently used to predict income excluding remittances (PREX) for households that initially
did receive income from remittances. Although not all households were matched, the co-
efficients gained from the matched control households will be applied to all households
that received remittances. It is important to note that this might allow for a new bias
to arise in the estimation. This is a notable shortcoming in the estimation of this paper,
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Table 7: Regression for Prediction of Income Excluding Remittances - Urban Households
(1) (2) (3)
PREX1 PREX2 PREX3
























Constant -15152.5∗∗∗ -19505.5∗∗∗ -18450.1∗∗∗
(-19.74) (-19.82) (-23.62)
Observations 4472 4161 4868
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Regression for Prediction of Income Excluding Remittances - Rural Households
(1) (2) (3)
PREX1 PREX2 PREX3
























Constant -5676.3∗∗∗ -9405.6∗∗∗ -6959.7∗∗∗
(-8.33) (-20.24) (-24.87)
Observations 6052 5473 6029
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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however this step is necessary for the results of the counterfactual to be comparable to
the results of the decomposition exercise. Estimating income excluding remittances for
the matched households only would not allow for such comparability. For these matched
households, however, bias should be reduced in the estimation of income excluding remit-
tances. Furthermore, the estimation still takes into account the behaviour of households
that may substitute the loss of income from remittances through compensating with in-
come from other sources. The estimation of the counterfactual is therefore still deemed
significant and superior to a counterfactual in which remittances are simply set to zero.
The counterfactual estimation will proceed as previously discussed.
The new income distribution is obtained by imputing the values of PREX for remit-
tance receiving households into the initial income distribution. Table 9 reports the Gini
coefficients that are obtained by using the different matching algorithms and when the
different regression methods are used. All Gini’s presented in Table 9 are calculated using
analytical weights provided by NIDS. This summary of the counterfactual Gini coeffi-
cients shows the robustness of the results obtained by using different estimation methods.
The Gini coefficients do not differ across kernel or nearest neighbour matching methods
nor across probit and logit estimations. As discussed previously, Smith and Todd (2005)
have found that the results of propensity score matching do not differ much across dif-
ferent matching methods. Hence, the robustness of the Gini across different estimation
methods is owed to the fact that although different matching algorithms were employed,
the same or similar households were assigned to treatment and control group after the
matching. As the prediction of income excluding remittances takes the same values for
the same matched households, overall results do not seem to differ. The fact that similar
or the same households were matched in either estimation method also supports the good
quality of the matching estimations applied.
The Gini coefficients of the counterfactual scenario converge towards the decomposed
Gini coefficients. Furthermore, the counterfactual reports generally higher Gini coeffi-
cients than the decomposition exercise. The biggest difference between the counterfactual
Gini and the decomposed Gini is observed in Wave 1. The counterfactual Gini reported is
0.67 whereas the decomposed Gini reports a value of 0.644. The differences in the consec-
utive Waves are more narrow and the smallest difference is reported in Wave 3 where the
counterfactual Gini reports a value of 0.6456 and the decomposed Gini states a level of
inequality of 0.6408. Overall, the differences between the counterfactual and the observed
Gini coefficients are small. However, the fact that the levels of the counterfactual Gini
are generally higher than present values means that inequality levels would be higher,
had there been no remittance payments. This result supports the finding from Table 3
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that a marginal change in income from remittances would lead to a (slight) decrease in
the overall Gini. The results of the decomposition may also explain why the difference
between the counterfactual and the decomposed Gini is more substantial for Wave 1. The
decomposition exercise revealed that in this wave, remittances have a relatively larger
share in overall household income compared to the other waves. Furthermore, the elas-
ticity reported is also slightly higher in Wave 1.
Finally, Table 9 reports the result of the level of inequality present if remittances were sim-
ply set to zero. This paper has argued that there is possibility for bias if a non-remittance
counterfactual would not take into account the different characteristics of migrants. Fur-
thermore, the counterfactual created in this paper has tried to account for the fact that
households that do not receive remittances will compensate the lack of income from this
source by increasing income from other sources. The levels of inequality reported for the
scenario where remittances are set to zero stress the necessity to account for these biases.
The Gini coefficients increase from Wave 1 where the Gini was 0.656 to 0.689 in Wave 2
only to decrease in Wave 3 to 0.648. This shows, that the Gini coefficient in this scenario
converges towards but is still slightly larger than the decomposed Gini in Wave 3. The
trend that the Gini increases in Wave 2 is surprising although the decomposed Gini also
increases mildly in Wave 2. Nevertheless, the differences between the case of remittances
being set to zero and the counterfactual created in this paper stress that the households’
behaviour of diversifying income towards other income sources should not be underesti-
mated.
Table 9: Gini coefficients in the Counterfactual Scenario - Estimated using different meth-
ods
Estimation Method WAVE 1 WAVE 2 WAVE 3
Probit MATCHING 0.6787 0.6651 0.6456
LOGIT MATCHING 0.6787 0.6651 0.6456
KERNEL MATCHING 0.6787 0.6651 0.6456
Decomposition 0.6441 0.6482 0.6408
Remittances set to zero 0.6564 0.6896 0.6482
In summation, this section has shown the results of the decomposition of the Gini co-
efficient according to income sources. This has revealed the strong relative contribution
of income from labour market activities to the overall Gini as well as the strongly de-
creasing effect of government grants on total inequality. However, the decomposition
exercise also showed the decreasing effects of remittances on overall inequality. This was
supported by the results of the estimation of a counterfactual scenario. This section has
employed propensity score matching using logit and probit models on a conditional dif-
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ference in difference matching estimator in order to determine non-remittance households
that are similar to remittance receiving households. Variables used in the creation of
this counterfactual are significant and robust across different matching methods applied.
Instrumentalizing propensity score matching enabled the estimation of household income
excluding remittances in a counterfactual scenario without remittance payments. These
estimations were then imputed in the distribution of household incomes and the coun-
terfactual level of inequality was calculated. This has revealed that without remittances,
there would be higher levels of inequality prevalent than the current.
6 Conclusion
This paper aimed at analyzing the effects that remittances from internal migration in
South Africa have on inequality. The NIDS panel data set offers comprehensive infor-
mation on household incomes from different sources and thus the ground for the analysis
completed in this paper. The information on different components of household income
was used to decompose the level of inequality prevalent in South Africa with respect to
different income sources. This decomposition featured not only the examination of the
Gini coefficients of the different income components but also the analysis of the role of
income from different sources in overall inequality. As such, the decomposition accord-
ing to the Lerman and Yitzhaki approach (1985) enabled the assessment of the effect
of remittances according to three important factors. Firstly, the share of remittances in
overall household income could be analyzed. Secondly, the level of inequality prevalent
within remittances was discussed and lastly, the correlation of remittances with the overall
Gini coefficient was estimated. However, not only remittances but income from different
components could be analyzed according to these three criteria. Furthermore, the decom-
position of the Gini coefficient allowed to assess the effect of a marginal change in one
income component on the overall level of inequality. To analyze the role of remittances in
this way is necessary as the role of remittances is not known a priori. Remittances may
have inequality reducing or increasing effects depending on where in the income distribu-
tion the remittance receiving household is located.
The decomposition of household income performed in this paper showed that remittances
have a potentially decreasing effect on inequality for South Africa, however, this effect
appears to be rather small and is dominated by largely negative effects that stem from
the high levels of inequality prevalent in income from the labour market. The paper finds
that overall levels of inequality are stagnating over the period of time that is covered by
the NIDS data set. Whereas in 2008 a Gini coefficient of 0.6441 was reported, South
African inequality shows a Gini of 0.6408 in 2012. This confirms findings of Leibbrandt
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and Finn (2012) who characterized levels of inequality in South Africa as remaining “stub-
bornly high”. However, for the first time in the post-apartheid era, levels of inequality
are slightly decreasing. Leibbrandt et al. (2010) show in their decomposition of income
that inequality had increased since 1993. From the decompositions results presented in
this paper it seems as though the increased increase in the share that government grants
make up in overall household income is one of the driving forces behind the decrease in
overall inequality. The decomposition in this paper shows that a marginal increase in state
transfers of 1 percent can lead to a decrease in the Gini coefficient of about 0.11 percent.
This finding, together with the increasing role of state transfers in the composition of
household income has certainly influenced the development of inequality levels in a pos-
itive manner. However, the decomposition exercise also shows the inequality decreasing
effect of remittances. While much smaller, a marginal increase in remittances may also
lead to a decrease of 0.01 percent in income inequality, the positive effect of remittances
is supported by the counterfactual constructed in this paper.
The counterfactual was meant to assess the income distribution without remittances.
Simply analyzing household incomes without remittances meanwhile holding income from
other sources constant, however, would lead to biased results. Therefore, this paper im-
plemented propensity score matching in the form of difference in difference matching and
several different matching algorithms to determine those non-remittance households that
are comparable to remittance receiving households. Smith and Todd (2005) have shown
that difference in difference matching estimators are suitable to reduce bias in estimations
given that the assumptions for this matching estimator are satisfied by the data. This
paper has shown that conditional difference in difference matching is the best alterna-
tive to reduce bias in the estimation of a non-remittance counterfactual despite certain
shortcomings. While the NIDS data satisfies the assumptions for difference in difference
matching estimations, the data available on remittance payers does not satisfy the ex-
clusion restriction for alternative estimations such as a double-selection Heckman (1979)
model. The coefficients obtained from those households that were matched using con-
ditional difference in difference estimators were then used to predict income excluding
remittances in the counterfactual scenario of no remittances. As a result of the method
applied in this paper, the counterfactual income distribution is more unequal for all three
waves. Furthermore, the results of the counterfactual scenario are strongly robust against
different matching methods, which supports the good quality of the matching achieved.
Higher levels of inequality present in the counterfactual income distribution are supporting
the previous finding that remittances indeed act as a reduction on inequality. However,
there is an overall trend of decreasing inequality apparent in the Gini coefficients of the
counterfactual. Finally, the comparison of the counterfactual results with the levels of
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inequality present if remittances were simply set to zero shows that with the exception
of Wave 1, the latter methods leads to (much) higher results for the Gini coefficient than
the counterfactual. These results support the assumption that households divert to other
sources of income in case of a fall-out from one income component such as remittances.
Through the method applied to estimate the counterfactual scenario in this paper it was
possible to account for this behaviour while the alternative of setting remittances to zero
was not able to do so.
All in all the decomposition of household income into different sources of income has
shown the strong positive effects of government grants. However, given this strong effect
of state transfers, the government has to be cautious to avoid overly strong dependency of
households on government grants as an income source and should strengthen alternative
ways to create income. Furthermore, the positive effects of government grants is domi-
nated by the strong negative effect of the largest income component, income from labour
market activities. The incredibly high levels of inequality within this income component
and its large contribution to the overall Gini stress how urgently the high levels of in-
equality in labour market income in South Africa need to be addressed. This demand is
supported by the results of the counterfactual analysis that have confirmed the decreasing
effect of remittances from internal (work) migrants on inequality. Thus, a possible way to
reduce inequality could be to ease ways for worker to move as well as improve channels
through which remittances can be sent home. Given the inequality reducing effect of
remittances, such policies may help to decrease the persistently high levels of inequality.
However, such policies may not have the desired outcome of an inequality reduction given
that remittances only have a small positive effect on inequality. More urgently, the high
level of inequality within labour income needs to be addressed. That calls for policies that
lead to job creation to tackle high levels of unemployment within the country or to make
room for entrepreneurship by improving channels to create (formal) self-employment. As
pointed out in Section 2.1, literature has discussed entrepreneurial potential of former
migrants as well as remittances being used to start own businesses. In a South African
context, these possibilities for the use of remittances need to be analyzed in order to ad-
dress inequality well-considered. Hence, future research may look into the analysis of the
use of remittances in South Africa. Other topics brought up in this paper and necessary
to investigate further may include a decomposition of the no-remittance counterfactual.
Such a decomposition would allow for a deeper understanding of how the loss of income
from remittances may be compensated for. Furthermore, the role of other sources of
income that have been discussed briefly in this paper, such as income from government
grants or labour market income, could be analyzed more closely to dissect the reasons for
persistently high inequality more closely. The high levels of income inequality in South
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Africa have been discussed thoroughly in this paper with regards to one income source,
remittances. In the future, there is room however, to analyze further income sources in
order to tackle South African inequality conclusively.
Notes
1The Kuznet curve generally describes the initial worsening of the degree of inequal-
ity during the developing stage of an economy which then relaxes into lower levels of
inequality, illustrated as an inverted u-shape.
2NIDS provides assistance with derived variables to allow the researcher better in-
sight. A set of Stata Do-Files can be downloaded from [http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/nids-
data/program-library/derived-files]. Extreme outliers are controlled for.
3According to Argent (2009), problems of asking for the market value of a dwelling
may be caused by people confusing the question “How much rent would you pay?”that
is supposed to be capturing the market value of that dwelling with how much they are
willing to pay for it. This may cause a bias in the values stated, however, there is hardly
a way to correct for this.
4Decomposition computed making use of Van Kerm, P. (2009), “sgini Generalized Gini
and Concentration coefficients (with factor decomposition) in Stata”, v1.1, CEPS/INSTEAD,
Dierdange, Luxembourg.
5Propensity score matching was completed using Leuven, E. and Sianesi, B. (2014)“PS-
MATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching,
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7 Appendix
Figure 3: Kernel Matching - Rural Households
Figure 4: Kernel Matching - Urban Households
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Table 10: t-Test after Kernel Matching - Rural Households
Mean %reduct.
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
ln PRIM1 Unmatched 7.6174 7.513 11.7
Matched 7.6174 7.6119 0.6 94.7
hhsizer1 Unmatched 6.8904 5.918 29.1
Matched 6.8904 6.7866 3.1 89.3
meanAGE1 Unmatched 23.48 26.268 -28.0
Matched 23.48 23.551 -0.7 97.5
adultage1 Unmatched 3.0541 2.8515 12.5
Matched 3.0541 3.0332 1.3 89.7
hhedu1 Unmatched 10.22 9.7146 18.4
Matched 10.22 10.212 0.3 98.4
African Unmatched .94705 .90515 16.1
Matched .94705 .94547 0.6 96.2
Coloured Unmatched .0224 .07026 -22.9
Matched .0224 .02527 -1.4 94.0
Asian Indian Unmatched .01103 .00698 4.3
Matched .01103 .01017 0.9 78.7
White Unmatched .00458 .00727 -3.5
Matched .00458 .0041 0.6 82.1
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.033 Matched 0.000
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Table 11: t-Test after Kernel Matching - Urban Households
Mean %reduct
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
ln PRIM1 Unmatched 8.0913 8.0701 2.0
Matched 8.0913 8.0769 1.4 32.0
hhsizer1 Unmatched 5.7691 4.8921 30.8
Matched 5.7691 5.6497 4.2 86.4
meanAGE1 Unmatched 26.039 27.988 -18.5
Matched 26.039 25.977 0.6 96.8
adultage1 Unmatched 3.0967 2.7545 22.3
Matched 3.0967 3.0766 1.3 94.1
hhedu1 Unmatched 11.08 10.803 11.6
Matched 11.08 11.066 0.6 94.9
African Unmatched .67755 .65966 3.8
Matched .67755 .67913 -0.3 91.1
Coloured Unmatched .26847 .24986 4.2
Matched .26847 .27055 -0.5 88.8
Asian Indian Unmatched .00883 .01521 -5.8
Matched .00883 .00928 -0.4 93.0
White Unmatched .0292 .05894 -14.5
Matched .0292 .026 1.6 89.2
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.022 Matched 0.001
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Table 12: t-Test after Logit Matching - Rural Households
Mean %reduct
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
ln PRIM1 Unmatched 7.6174 7.513 11.7
Matched 7.6174 7.6002 1.9 83.5
hhsizer1 Unmatched 6.8904 5.918 29.1
Matched 6.8904 6.5104 11.4 60.9
meanAGE1 Unmatched 23.48 26.268 -28.0
Matched 23.48 23.304 1.8 93.7
adultage1 Unmatched 3.0541 2.8515 12.5
Matched 3.0541 2.8555 12.2 2.0
hhedu1 Unmatched 10.22 9.7146 18.4
Matched 10.22 10.162 2.1 88.6
African Unmatched .94705 .90515 16.1
Matched .94705 .92346 9.0 43.7
Coloured Unmatched .0224 .07026 -22.9
Matched .0224 .0205 0.9 96.0
Asian Indian Unmatched .01103 .00698 4.3
Matched .01103 .02234 -12.0 -179.2
White Unmatched .00458 .00727 -3.5
Matched .00458 .00411 0.6 82.3
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.033 Matched 0.007
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Table 13: t-Test after Logit Matching - Urban Households
Mean %reduct
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias
ln PRIM1 Unmatched 8.0913 8.0701 2.0
Matched 8.0913 8.0849 0.6 69.9
hhsizer1 Unmatched 5.7691 4.8921 30.8
Matched 5.7691 5.7215 1.7 94.6
meanAGE1 Unmatched 26.039 27.988 -18.5
Matched 26.039 26.351 -3.0 84.0
adultage1 Unmatched 3.0967 2.7545 22.3
Matched 3.0967 3.1136 -1.1 95.1
hhedu1 Unmatched 11.08 10.803 11.6
Matched 11.08 11.132 -2.2 81.2
African Unmatched .67755 .65966 3.8
Matched .67755 .69144 -3.0 22.4
Coloured Unmatched .26847 .24986 4.2
Matched .26847 .25934 2.1 50.9
Asian Indian Unmatched .00883 .01521 -5.8
Matched .00883 .00957 -0.7 88.4
White Unmatched .0292 .05894 -14.5
Matched .0292 .02297 3.0 79.0
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.022 Matched 0.001
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Figure 5: Nearest Neighbour Logit Matching - Rural Households
Figure 6: Nearest Neighbour Logit Matching - Urban Households
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